


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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

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Undeclared Strategic Agendas in Gulf

91AE0085A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew
30 Oct 90 pp 7, 25

[Article by Ron Ben-Yishay]

[Text] War is war, and the deception of one's adversary is legitimate and acceptable. However, in the gulf crisis, matters are topsy-turvy. Leaders on both sides of the barricade are not bluffing their opponents, but their peoples and allies.

They say one thing in public and its complete opposite behind the scenes.

Some do this simply to survive, such as King Husayn or the Saudis. However, others, beginning with President Bush and his aides, and ending with presidents Mubarak and al-Asad, use Orwellian "newspeak" as a fishing rod to fish in turbid water, as a tool for gaining a good spot in the center of the new world order, influence, weapons, and, above all, money, a lot of money, even before the scale has been tipped in the gulf crisis.

The generals are the Americans. While more than 100,000 Americans in uniform, with their heavy equipment and weapons, are situated on the border of Iraq and in gulf waters, the administration announces a plan to sell billions in arms to Saudi Arabia "so that it can defend itself from the Iraqi threat," state administration spokesmen without blinking.

When President Bush took a stand to curb Saddam Husayn in the Gulf, his motives were no doubt moral, to the extent that they stemmed from sober, economic considerations. Nonetheless, in the course of managing the crisis, his administration has been attempting to make a profit on the side. The United States is on the threshold of an economic recession, sharp budget cuts, and rising oil prices. It needs every billion that it can mobilize for its faltering business community. This is actually the real reason for the large arms deals sales to Saudi Arabia. It should be remembered that the Bush-Baker administration is a faithful representative of the way of thinking and interests of the "Waspish" community of large businesses in the eastern United States, just as Jimmy Carter was once the faithful representative of the "bible belt" in the southern United States.

It is currently difficult to know who initiated the Saudi deals. Was it the desert princes, whose appetite for sophisticated metal toys is insatiable? Perhaps people in the Pentagon convinced the Saudis to buy astronomical amounts of American arms as a token of their appreciation for the superpower that rushed to their aid. Either way, the result is clear: By placing emergency—as it were—orders with the American arms industry, the Saudis will inject billions of dollars into the U.S. economy.

In the Pentagon, they are filled with happiness at the sight of the noisy arms bazaar. The Pentagon architects of the Saudi arms deals informed Congress that the

clients need the weapons urgently. Hence, it was necessary to immediately remove the first shipments from the order of forces of the American Army and Air Force. It is understood that these weapons are not from front-line units, whose equipment is new, modern, and mostly in Saudi Arabia. Rather, it is from lower-quality units, whose equipment is old.

Thus, at a later time, the representatives of the Army and Air Force can ask Congress for an allocation to procure equipment similar to that delivered to Saudi Arabia and in the same quantities. However, this replacement equipment—pay attention—would represent newer, more modern versions of the equipment sold to Saudi Arabia. No one in the legislature will be able to refuse them.

The deals also serve the American generals' long-range intentions in the Middle East. When the current crisis passes, arms will continue to arrive in Saudi Arabia. In another three to five years, hundreds of modern tanks and aircraft will be there, ready to serve the United States when it needs them. The Saudis obviously do not have, and will not have in coming years, enough skilled manpower to man two artillery divisions equipped with 700 Abrams tanks (mark 2), which are among the most modern in the world, not to speak of hundreds of trained pilots for 100 F-15 aircraft.

The Pentagon is hiding this behind the grave expressions of its people testifying before Congress that Saudi Arabia desperately needs billions in arms to defend itself. A small, "energetic exercise" is added to the economic bluff: Initially, it was leaked to the press that the deals amounted to \$24 billion. Later, when a cry went up, a dramatic announcement was publicized, which stated that the deals had been cut to about \$10 billion, the sum that was originally planned from the start.

Israel receives the explanation that it has no cause for concern. Why not? Because the Saudis lack sufficient, skilled manpower for these arms, and because the Saudis have yet to digest the American arms that they already received. Aside from that, those on the banks of the Potomac promise that they will help Israel maintain its qualitative advantage in a way that will balance the quantitative force ratios, which do not favor Israel.

For the time being, this is also a bluff, a promise devoid of content and intended entirely as a convenient explanation for members of Congress, so that they will not stop the Saudi deals. Supplying the Arab countries with Patriot missiles, F-15 aircraft, and an advanced version of the Abrams tank further impairs Israel more in terms of quality than quantity, because every addition [to Arab arsenals] of weapons systems based on American technologies reduces Israel's technological advantage. The two batteries of Patriot missiles, the 15 F-15 aircraft of the old models, and the 10 Puffins [Yas'urim] that the United States will sell to Israel at bargain prices are a nice holiday gift at most.

In the meantime, the United States is not willing to give Israel an increase in military aid that will enable it to

maintain its qualitative advantage. Even the Israeli request that the United States share in the budgets of innovative Israeli research and development projects encountered an evasive answer in Washington, as did Israel's request to receive information from American intelligence satellites in real time. That request was answered in part, only as a perfunctory act, so that Israel would not lose the famous restraint at which it has excelled recently.

It can be assumed that the administration wants to be more generous toward Israel, but is prevented by budgetary constraints. However, just as the United States mobilized emergency aid for Egypt and Turkey from the Arab states, it can organize emergency aid for Israel from West Germany and Japan for example.

But in the meantime, the only thing that the American administration is willing to grant Israel abundantly is flattery and gestures of respect for David Levi. It is doing so on the sufficiently grounded assumption that Israel's ambitious foreign minister will do the work of Baker and Cheney and will neutralize Defense Minister Moshe Arens' concerned clamor, which, it should be said, is justified. Our ministers streaming to Washington also excel, as do their hosts, in the art of "newspeak." The transfer of our internal, political wrestling ring to Washington is also apparently a sign of the new world order that is taking shape.

As in the story of *Had Gadya* [a Jewish folk song whose moral is that there is no sin without punishment], U.S. behavior toward us is very similar to the behavior of Japan and West Germany toward the United States. Behind a smoke screen of lofty declarations about standing by the United States' side, these two economic superpowers are unwilling to lift a finger, let alone open their purses. There is nothing to discuss regarding the dispatch of forces, because the laws of West Germany and Japan prohibit them from using military forces outside their borders.

Policymakers in these two economic superpowers apparently know that, in the new world order, economic rivalry is bound to supplant ideological rivalry. It is no surprise, therefore, that they are not overjoyed about helping a competing giant, which is bearing the load of the gulf crisis, even if that giant is doing the work for them.

As a result of considerable pressure, the Japanese agreed to contribute \$4 billion to the American war effort, half of which is of course Japanese trucks and equipment. In this way, Japan will contribute more to the profits of Japanese industry than it will to the Americans' enjoyment of the aid.

West Germany's treatment of the United States' requests for aid is similar to that of Japan. In these very days, Chancellor Kohl can be seen at Baker's side, shedding an emotional tear as he recalls the United States' contribution to Germany's reconstruction and defense after WWII. However, he is unwilling to give any real sum of

money. West Germany is willing to contribute somewhat less than \$2 billion, arguing that it is bearing the heavy burden of East Germany, which is uniting with it. A substantial portion of this contribution is also in goods.

Washington, which initiated and financed the Marshall plan after WWII to salvage the economy of its two former enemies, is now learning an instructive, bitter lesson about the weak link between gratitude, rhetoric, and deeds.

In the gulf region itself, "newspeak" is a tradition and a way of life. In times of crisis, it flourishes. Take the Iranians for example. The world was amazed when the Iranians responded positively to the wooing of Saddam Husayn, their arch-enemy, and renewed diplomatic relations with him. Iranian leaders announced that they are standing by Iraq's side in the jihad against the Americans, and they hinted that they would allow Iraq to receive food and even export oil through them. In the meantime, they took, as an advance, all that they could: The few areas of Iran that Iraq occupied in the eight-year war, control of the Shatt-al-Arab, and the return of thousands of Iranian prisoners. At the same time, they also became free of tens of thousands of Iraqi prisoners who burdened them for years.

However, apart from enthusiastic rhetoric, the ayatollahs have yet to contribute something to Saddam Husayn's war effort, and they are apparently not intending to do anything of that direction in the near future. Perhaps the butcher of Baghdad now understands that the clever merchants of the bazaar used him, not only to strip him of his meager spoils of war, but mainly to extract concessions from the Americans.

The threat to help Iraq was but a lever in Rafsanjani's hands to extricate Iran from its international isolation and to advance stalled negotiations on Iranian assets frozen in the United States since the Shah's fall. Indeed, with the active help of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, matters are progressing in the direction desired by Tehran. Britain has renewed diplomatic relations with Iran, President Bush has made several encouraging statements about his intention to move toward Iran, and the Soviet foreign minister emerged arm-in-arm with his Iranian counterpart in front of reporters at U.N. headquarters in New York. In exchange, Hizballah in Lebanon released several Irish hostages several weeks ago, and it should be assumed that other deals are brewing beneath the surface. Saddam Husayn's hopes for salvation from the East are fading away.

Nonetheless, the last word has not been said. Al-Asad is also liable to suddenly realize that his allies are robbing him of all of his possessions. In Tehran, there are two rival factions, which are actually maintaining two separate governments. Rafsanjani's faction currently has the upper hand. This faction favors the strengthening of Iran through rapprochement with the West. Al-Asad is thus succeeding in his mediation efforts. However, if, for any reason, the extremists' faction, headed by Khamene'i

and Khomeini's son, should suddenly become strong, al-Asad's luck is bound to change, and the Iranian scale will tilt toward Saddam Husayn.

The Saudis do not need money. The increase in oil prices stemming from the crisis is causing millions of dollars to enter their treasury each day. However, the members of the royal Saudi family fear for themselves. Saddam Husayn is undermining the legitimacy of their regime by claiming that they betrayed the Arab cause and abandoned the holy places to the protection of the infidels. In his frequent speeches, he even outlawed them.

The descendants of sharif Husayn [of the house of Hashim, instated in 1908 as ruler of Hijaz] from Mecca know well that these declarations are falling on attentive ears in the Arab world. Therefore, in order to create for themselves an alibi in the Arab and Muslim world, they are reiterating that they will not permit an attack to be initiated against Iraq from their territory. At the same time, behind the scenes, it does not bother them to urge the Americans to speedily deal a full-strength blow against Iraq. Members of Congress returning from a tour of Saudi Arabia relate that members of the royal family are pressuring them to recommend that the administration take action.

In the hope of finally rousing Uncle Sam from his resting place, the Saudis remind their guests of the approaching Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. In December, hundreds of

thousands of pilgrims will stream to Mecca to fulfill the commandments of the pilgrimage to Mecca. The annual pilgrimage is a golden opportunity for Saddam Husayn to send hundreds, perhaps thousands, of terrorists and agents to incite and inflame bloody riots.

The presence of tens of thousands of American, Christian (in addition to Jewish and female!) soldiers in the kingdom is liable to contribute to the excitation of impulses and cause a great explosion, next to which the disturbances initiated by Khomeini's followers in Mecca at the height of the Iran-Iraq War would pale. Since those disturbances, Iran has claimed that King Fahd and his princes are neither suitable nor able to defend the holy sites of Islam. If Saddam Husayn survives until December, arguments of this type will fall on the especially attentive ears of millions of his admirers in the Arab world. It is no wonder that the Saudis are hysterical and constantly asking the Americans when they will move northward. They are simultaneously continuing, as stated, to claim in public that the purpose of American forces is solely defensive, and that they will not allow an attack against Iraq.

There is no reason to enumerate all of the "newspeak" phenomena connected to the gulf crisis. There is not enough paper. However, we commentators are forbidden to complain. If the mouths and hearts of politicians were in harmony, we would not—God forbid—have a livelihood.

Motives for Early Independence Outlined*91AS0115A Paris HARATCH in Armenian 7-13 Jul 90*

[Article in five installments by Vazgen Manukyan, currently the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR; originally published in Yerevan HAYK, the official press organ of the Armenian Pannational Movement: "It Is Time to Jump off the Train"]

[7-8 Jul 90 pp 2, 3]

[Excerpt] [HARATCH editor's note] Despite its length, we found it necessary to publish in full this series of articles by Vazgen Manukyan, a well-known member of the Karabakh Committee and a member of the administration of the Armenian Pannational Movement [APM] (the article was originally published in the 20-27 May and 10-17 June issue of HAYK, the official press organ of APM), because the article offers a realistic and comprehensive analysis of the political present and its possible future. It is an analysis which may serve as the basic platform for the political work of Armenia's future government.

[Begin article] No nation or government can base its economic and political plans solely on its own aspirations and internal realities. National plans and the priorities to solve problems must be based not only on an assessment of the condition of one's neighbors and the world, but also a forecast of the direction in which the world is moving. Obviously it is not possible to assess the direction of developments precisely. Therefore one must study probable alternative outcomes directly, and, when appropriate, take a reasonable risk without which nothing can be accomplished. If one does not calculate or try to predict, then one must choose one of two options: Either to go with the current and wait for things to happen (obviously nothing good can happen on its own); or, when one's nerves can no longer tolerate the strain of uncertainty, to resort to the slogan of "freedom or death" with hysteric emotions—which, if correct for the individual, is unacceptable for a whole nation. Our present reality is a vivid manifestation of these two options.

Today our nation is going through a fateful period as we all become gradually more convinced that the unfolding of events may permit the realization of our nation's eternal dream, the restoration of independent statehood, without which all of our pending national problems will remain unresolved. The prospects of autonomous existence that have opened before us intimidate many people. The heaviest burden in the world is the responsibility of making independent decisions. Slavery is agreeable in the sense that it removes this burden from people and frees them from any pressures of responsibility. The man who is used to enslavement is afraid of freedom and responsibility. It is no coincidence that, at a time when opportunities to take and implement independent decisions about the future of our nation have opened up before us, there are people who speak gloomily about dead-ends. No, there are no dead-ends; there is only a difficult path which has been trodden by many nations

and which leads to happiness. The only thing that is required is cooperation, unity, rational calculation and determination.

Now let us try to understand the direction in which the Soviet Union is moving and the causes of that movement, and let us see what can be done and how accordingly. The most widely accepted opinion on these problems, which was initially espoused by the Karabakh Committee and later by numerous organizations and individuals, is the following:

Confronted by a deep economic and political crisis, the Soviet Union was forced to undertake reforms and tried to create a democratic society and a free-market economy. Taking advantage of that situation we must seek economic independence and sovereignty and must be prepared to declare independence at the opportune moment. Even so, independence intimidates many people because of Turkey's proximity (interestingly, these same people talk about recovering Armenian lands from Turkey with incomprehensible boldness), and as a result the following mentality exists: We must seek a confederation and be satisfied with that; since European nations are also giving up some of their sovereignty and creating a new type of federation, this must be the path of development. First, let us note that before something can be given up that something must be had so that one can decide when to give it up and to whom and what one will receive in return. Second, the concept of independence and its legal status has changed over time. Today Europe is the scene of processes in which all countries of the world are participating in one form or another, initially creating large clusters of states which will in the future coalesce into a single international unified entity. The concept of independence in the 21st century is being shaped according to these processes.

Let us also note that a state organized as a confederation is unstable and that all confederations known in history (the Swiss confederation, the United States, the German confederation and others) have trodden the same path: confederation, then federation, finally becoming a single unitary state. [passage omitted]

[10 Jul 90 p 2]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] It is understandable that Russia will not vanish from the face of the earth and that sooner or later a united Russia will be built on the largest piece left over from the [Soviet] Empire. Let us put aside for the moment the question of how many stages that would take, how many victims would be required and what perils await its course. Let us suppose something fantastic. Let us assume that we manage to survive all the perils and become part of the united democratic Russia that will be created. Would that help or hurt us? In my opinion it would not help us. If that almost impossible outcome becomes reality and we become part of a united democratic Russia, it would mean the end of the millennia-old history of the Armenian people, similar to the demise of the national histories of Scotland and Wales.

In these countries there are obviously parties which desire independence, but the widespread Anglicization of these nations and the system of equality and the high standard of living that exists in Great Britain have turned independence into an exotic entity for the overwhelming majority of Scots and Welsh. As a result, these nations have been driven out of the stage of human history. Similarly, today there are no Shumars, Aramaics, Laks or Gargarians. After some time there will also be no Scotsmen or Welshmen. Do we want to have the same fate? We, Armenians, have seen the construction of the Egyptian pyramids. We have fought against the Assyrians and ancient Rome. During the reign of Tigranes the Great we expanded until the Red Sea. We have participated in the growth and spread of universal religions, Christianity and Islam. The most powerful empires have risen and fallen before our eyes. We have given much to the world and we have picked up much while treading through a path of tribulations. But I remain deeply convinced that everything remains in the future. We have not yet accomplished the mission for which God created us, and it would be a sacrilege against God, humanity and our ancestors if we stop carrying our cross, we do not seize our chance to establish an independent state at the first opportune moment. Consequently, this unlikely unfolding of events whereby we become part of a united Russia by miraculously surviving all the perils that await the collapsing empire would not help us. We must seek to restore our independent statehood.

From aspirations and fantastic hypotheses, let us return to our days. Driven by serious problems, the Soviet Union is being transformed from one stable state to another. We are now in a period of transition. It is important to note that secession is possible only during the time of transition; the prospect of secession is never a feature of a stable state. Consequently, we must realize our aspiration to restore our independent statehood during this time of transition whose duration we do not know.

Let us look at the various possible scenarios whereby events may develop:

1. The British Alternative

For us this is the most desirable but most unlikely outcome. If this outcome comes about, what happened to the British Empire after World War II will happen in the Soviet Union. In other words all conquered nations will gradually establish their independent states virtually without a fight. Such a development of events would be the most favorable outcome for us because it allows us not to hurry, to improve our economy gradually, to create a healthy psychological climate in the Republic, to free ourselves from the habits that have been imposed on us during the last 70 years, to return to our national roots, to consolidate the foundations of democracy, to resolve the Karabakh issue in one way or another and to secede from the Soviet Union without a major struggle at an appropriate moment in time. I think that such a

favorable unfolding of events is nearly impossible for the following reasons: I already mentioned one of them, namely the unstable economic condition of the Soviet Union, from which it will be impossible to settle without turmoil. The second reason is this: In forming its empire, Britain was primarily motivated by characteristically Anglo-Saxon pragmatic objectives and pursued economic gain. When the world economic order changed, scientific and technological revolutions opened new opportunities for development and the country's economic development no longer depended on having colonies, Britain granted independence without a fight to peoples it had conquered. Russia's situation is a little different. The conquest policy of this nation had an important characteristic. Russia obviously benefited economically from the natural resources of the countries it conquered, but that was not the principal factor driving it. Deeply ingrained in the mind of the Russian people is the notion that by pursuing a policy of conquest and expansion it is performing a mission ordained by God and that by conquering and Russifying the peoples in its path of expansion it brings them happiness. The Russian people would not easily give up this mystical national philosophy. There is another consideration: Even England did not give up easily the conquered territories which formed an immediate extension of its national territory. It granted independence to southern Ireland with great reluctance. Northern Ireland is still struggling, and Scotland and Wales were never liberated. In Russia's case, all the conquered territories constitute an extension of its national territory, and it is clear that it will not grant freedom to those territories easily.

Having examined the British alternative, I would like to note that even the colonies which won their freedom very easily first declared their intention to create an independent state and then entered into negotiations with the British government to determine a timetable of transition allowing only gradual progress toward independence. Consequently, experience shows that even if events unfold in accordance with this nearly impossible scenario, it is still essential to demonstrate a certain degree of determination and to declare officially our intention to restore our independent statehood; an independent economy can be developed only after talks to be held with the center conclude successfully.

[11 Jul 90 pp 2, 3]

[Text] 2. The Multistage Alternative

Let us examine this more probable development of events. Russia's progress toward the creation of a democratic state will most probably occur over several stages. If the Soviet Union manages, even only slightly, to extricate itself from its present crisis, to harmonize its development with that of the rest of the world, to raise the people's standard of living and to have access to modern technologies, then there will be forces (which will most likely be led by Gorbachev himself) who will not be interested in pushing ahead with these reforms and who will be satisfied with what has already been

gained. As a result the doors will once again be shut before the peoples who have not seceded from the Empire by that time, and a semidemocratic state may be created which may remain like that until its next phase of harmonization with international development trends. This process may go on, stage by stage, each stage with its own unpredictable perils, while the nation grows weaker during the intervals between the stages. One upheaval after another may come, each of which may terminate the life of our nation. In such conditions, the restoration of independent statehood would not only serve lofty national objectives, save us from slavery and give us the opportunity to have prosperous lives, but would also be the only means of protecting the physical existence of our nation.

3. The Annihilation Alternative

As we already mentioned in our description of the present status of the Soviet Union, the country's economy is at an impasse, the centrifugal forces in the country have grown stronger, and ungovernable processes which may lead to the collapse of the Empire are under way.

Any attempt to stop the processes that are under way in the country using brute force would, after a brief interval, bring about chaos and upheaval, and the Empire would begin to come apart at a faster pace. Then we would be threatened by the danger of being crushed under the rubble of the Empire. Rather than gaining our independence through such an explosion, it would be desirable to greet the explosion as an already independent state recognized by all the countries of the world. Besides the obvious advantages, let us mention the following: Our neighbor Turkey is trying to move in the direction of general world development, to transform its policy of external conquest to one of internal development and to become a modern developed country (we must acknowledge that it has made considerable progress in this regard). However, if the Soviet Union collapses uncontrollably, it is very likely that forces which do not have too much political weight in Turkey today may raise their heads, and that country may temporarily move away from its present course and seize the relatively more easily digestible fragments of the Soviet Union before returning to its present course.

If the events develop along this path, the other neighbors of the Soviet Union may also pose a similar threat and may try to seize other fragments of a disintegrating empire. It is obvious that if we have become independent by then we would have acquired certain advantages in, for example, the defense of Armenia and the solution of some of our national problems.

Such an outcome is probable if it becomes impossible to rein in the uncontrollable processes and to stop the disintegration of the country by turmoil and chaos despite the efforts of the Soviet government and the wishes of the West. The extent to which the forces operating in the Soviet Union can restrain themselves

and are willing to renounce selfish aspirations for the common good will play a determinant role in preventing this outcome from happening. To illustrate my point let me cite the example of the Baltic republics. Taking advantage of the favorable conditions they took a determined step—in my opinion correctly—and declared their independence in different forms. Although they have not yet been granted independence and that process may take years, the principal step has been taken; these republics have assured for themselves the option of stepping aside if the Soviet Union collapses, have realized the aspirations of their peoples and have attained the means for autonomous development. Although with their actions the Baltic republics put the other peoples of the Soviet Union in a difficult position and increased tensions in the country, they set an important precedent for the peoples who want to be liberated from the Empire hand in hand and step by step. Can the Baltic republics be condemned for their selfishness? They may or may not be condemned, but that is not the important point. The important point is that the most basic law of politics states that if you have any opportunity to realize any national aspiration then you must utilize it immediately and you must not sacrifice national interests for the sake of others. Then it may be too late. History does not forgive those who do not take advantage of the opportunities presented to them. These are the brutal rules of politics, and whether we like it or not we are subject to those rules.

The examination of this option indicates that its probability is very high.

We made an important observation earlier: Moved by serious circumstances, the Soviet Union goes from one stable state to another. At present we are in one of those periods of transition. It is important to note that secession is possible only during periods of transition; the prospect of secession is never a feature of a stable state. With that in mind, we examined three hypothetical possible outcomes of events. Except for the first possible outcome, whose probability is very slim, the examination of the remaining outcomes shows that we must secede as soon as possible because delaying it may pose a direct threat to the survival of the nation.

We must hurry also for another reason. The notion that we can develop our economy while remaining in the Soviet Union and then secede is entirely unfounded. That is a lure which they are trying to use to keep us in the Empire while they settle their own problems—that is a lure for the transition period. The truth is that they will give us some supplies and materials for which they will demand higher and higher payments while they prevent us from developing our economy in our own way through numerous laws. Obviously we can circumvent some of the obstacles if we struggle hard, but new ones will always be created and our Supreme Soviet will be constantly busy with issuing notes of protest and confronting the center with dismal results. Nothing prompted the Baltic republics to hurry to choose the path of independence more than the awareness arising from

their recent experience that it is impossible to develop their economies while remaining part of the Soviet Union. The economy of the Soviet Union will continue to slide down the economic abyss pulling us down with it and not allowing us any prospects of development. If we stand alone, we will possibly slide down the said economic abyss even more rapidly at the beginning, but not being tied to the collapsing economy of a vast country we will begin to come out of the abyss much faster. Our autonomy, the innate entrepreneurial spirit of the Armenian people and the existence of a Diaspora will have a great significance on this issue.

Consequently we must hurry toward independence. However, that raises the issue of the means of realizing that goal. It is true that staying within the Soviet Union promises us no prospects for the future. It is true that hesitation may prove to be hazardous to us. It is also true that hasty steps taken without thinking may prove to be equally hazardous. We have already had the bitter experience of the dangers of taking abrupt actions within a disintegrating empire. From that perspective let us examine the current situation in the Soviet Union.

In the previous section we noted that it is very difficult for the Russian nation to come to terms with the notion that it may lose some of the territories it has conquered (that is largely true of all conquerors). Of special significance on this issue are the peculiar mentality of the Russian people which has taken root over many centuries and its desire to continue using the conquered territories for military and political purposes. However, at present, a strange psychological state, favorable to our objectives, has surfaced among the Russian people. Russia's preoccupation with its own affairs has for a moment made it forget its imperial instincts and aspirations. The search for culprits for the despondent economic condition of the country and the desire to come out of that situation has convinced the Russians that in the past they were serving the conquered peoples; that now Russia must renounce the mentality of "bringing happiness" to the conquered peoples and pursue its own economic interests; and that it must tell these conquered peoples, though somewhat offended by their "ungratefulness," to "go away and save their skulls on their own." In addition, the developments and revelations of the last 2 years have created among some Russians a feeling of having sinned against the conquered peoples. As a result, they want to demonstrate that they are abandoning their old policy and that they are willing to grant freedom to those peoples (it was the same feeling of repentance among the Germans after World War II that is now rapidly vanishing as they grow stronger). All this is transitory and short-lived. As M. Gorbachev stated correctly in one of his speeches, imperialism has taken root in their genes. Moreover, I suspect that in addition to the objective factors, M. Gorbachev himself has a role in all these.

The truth is that, as we noted earlier, M. Gorbachev wants to solve simultaneously two mutually opposing problems. On the one hand he wants to ensure the

democratic and economic development of the country trying to go in the direction of international progress. On the other hand, he is trying to preserve the territorial integrity of the Empire during the transition period by employing unequal development, conspiracy, military force and economic and national lures. Convinced that it is impossible to solve these two problems simultaneously and having already chosen the path of international development, I think that he has been forced to conclude that he must come to terms with some territorial losses. Obviously, the less he loses the better for him. However that is possible only if the Russian nation also agrees with him. Thus this idea has begun to be infused into the Russian people very carefully while Gorbachev unexpectedly talks about not losing territories "conquered by the blood of ancestors." That is the way M. Gorbachev likes to operate. First he pushes the issue forward and creates a favorable public opinion, then he begins applying restraints so that the process does not assume a dangerous pace and major proportions. Meanwhile, he assures himself an alibi by advocating exactly the opposite course. Several examples can be cited. Let us only mention one; he acted exactly the same way on the issue of transition to a multiparty system. When he began to talk unexpectedly in 1988 that no parties other than the communist party are necessary, it became clear to everyone that the monopoly of the Communist Party is condemned to end. Gorbachev always assumes the role of a restraining force depending on the political circumstances. It is not so important whether he does that consciously or by instinct. From the outside one can only admire the skill with which he does it. Therefore, in my opinion, this political ploy by Gorbachev together with real objective factors have brought about a change in the imperialist dispositions of the Russian nation. B. Yeltsin skillfully took advantage of the current sentiments prevailing in Russia to gain significant political power thus aggravating the instability of the Soviet Union.

What has been stated above does not mean that M. Gorbachev will consent to the restoration of Armenia's independent statehood without any resistance, or that the Russian people will easily accede to the idea.

I think that we stand at the start of a period which is favorable for raising the issue of our independence and that that period may not last long. However, the question of how we raise this issue is of vital importance.

It would be unacceptable for the Soviet government and very dangerous for us if we declare independence in the same way as Lithuania did. Several factors play a role in this matter:

1. The strategic objectives of the Soviet Union in its European sector, in the Caucasus and Central Asia are different. Given that by harmonizing the country's development with the general development of mankind, the Soviet Union may wish to join the European Community. As a result the territories it loses in Europe would still be associated with it in one way or another (obviously much less than they were in the past). In the

case of the Caucasus, however, some of the liberated nations may join the economic circle of other countries (Turkey's admission into the EC may assume major importance for the Soviet Union in that case). Losing the republics of Central Asia is much more dangerous because they would surely enter the economic and political orbit of other countries and will be lost to Russia forever.

2. For Russia, the Caucasus is a much older conquest than the Baltic states. Not only Russia but also the West are inclined to agree that these territories are already inseparable parts of Russia. In addition, some countries have never recognized the annexation of the Baltic republics to the Soviet Union. It must also be remembered that military intervention in the Baltic republics would be severely opposed by the West because it is not warranted by the peaceful means of struggle that those nations have employed and because it reminds the West of Soviet interventions in Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia and others). Gorbachev cannot ignore that; in that event he may lose the gains made in the past few years that are very important for the Soviet Union. In contrast, military intervention in the Caucasus has already become a routine event and is received with "understanding" in the West. Such interventions disturb only slightly the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, namely Turkey and Iran. Arbitrary armed interventions and the use of military force in the Transcaucasus appears to be "justified" and is met with the West's silence.

[12 Jul 90 p 4]

[Text] Today there is only one course for us to restore our independent statehood: The constitutional path, which allows us to accomplish that task with minimum conflict with the center and which does not permit it to resort to at least overt actions against us. It is true that everything has been done to generate skepticism among our people against the constitutional path, but there is no other course. The USSR Supreme Soviet has passed a complex law regarding the secession of union republics. We can apparently take the step of seceding from the Soviet Union constitutionally solely on the basis of that law. We must invoke that law. Rather than elaborating on the details of the implementation of that law, let us just note that before taking advantage of the law a preparatory period is necessary to do explanatory work with the people and that, later, an unofficial referendum must be held to hear the views of the people on secession. Only then would the Armenian Supreme Soviet have the right to invoke that law and to take decisive steps. However, we must hurry because the opportunities that have been presented to us may not come again. History does not forgive those who are late. After taking the initial steps we will have the opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet authorities on our semi-independent status which, according to the law, we can have for 5 years. Once the status quo is changed we would have many more opportunities than what we have now to take this or that decisive step. For the moment let us not

discuss how the Soviet Union may retaliate if we claim our constitutional right. Let us see what we want to gain from our negotiations with the Soviet authorities, what that semi-independent status—that is when we are still part of the Soviet Union but have some degree of autonomy—can give us. Let us note that our move toward independence will abruptly improve our relations with our neighbors and focus the attention of the entire world on us (although it would be dangerous to be enticed by that, it would be foolish not to take advantage of it). The status of semi-independence, if we can attain it and if Russia is forced to accept that situation, will immediately transform us from a despised slave to a strategically important friend in the eyes of Russia. What plans should we try to implement during this transition period of semi-independence? In the area of economics we must implement an abrupt transition to private ownership of property; a free market; private, individual and shareholder ownership of land and means of production; and an open-door policy for foreign capital, and we must guarantee the inviolability of private ownership. Not only joint ventures with foreign countries should be encouraged, but foreign countries must be allowed to build their own enterprises in our Republic, because that is the trend of development across the world. After some time we too will have our own enterprises in other countries.

It is important to make the transition to private ownership and to establish a free market very quickly and abruptly, ahead of the Soviet Union. That would make it relatively easier for us to withstand the inflation that is characteristic of the period of transition from state to private ownership of property. Initially the inflation that will be generated as a result of large transactions will spread across the entire and vast Soviet monetary system and will have little impact. However, later we must act quickly to create our own money. Otherwise the ailing Soviet economy and currency would not allow us to develop our economy. In sum, we must hold on to the Soviet currency while we are sliding down the abyss and make use of our own money when we are coming out of it. Life will be hard for some time but will improve gradually. Anyone who claims that such an economic program can be implemented to improve the economic status of the people without a certain decline in the standard of living knows nothing about economics or is lying to and deceiving the people in order to make political capital for himself. There will be difficulties but there is no other way (if we stay within the Soviet Union we will suffer greater and more protracted difficulties).

The government and the charity organizations must try to mitigate the plight of the poor. It is important to realize that social justice can be achieved only through the development of the economy. Equal distribution of the few can only produce equally distributed poverty and a stagnation of development. Conditions must be created whereby people will have the opportunity to become wealthy through noble work, establishment of private trade and industry enterprises and entrepreneurship but not through robbery. It is the government's

responsibility to make sure that the poor do not get poorer, that they are given the chance to have a decent life and that the rich do not use their wealth to establish monopolies in the economy.

After creating our own currency, it will be necessary to invite various international finance organizations to Armenia to develop the country. Generally speaking the more economic ties we establish and the more international associations we become part of, the more people will have a stake in preserving our independence. The private ownership of land and means of production will create in Armenia a class which will have a stake in preserving our independence, not only out of lofty motives but also because of individual interests.

The establishment of trade ties with our neighbors and access to their transportation routes with mutual benefits obviously is of great importance for the development of our economy. Trade ties with Turkey do not contradict our national interests, and, according to some reports, Turkey also considers such trade beneficial to itself. One can cite several examples demonstrating that complex political differences do not prevent neighboring countries from engaging in trade with each other. As for the establishment of political and diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia, one precondition for talks to be held in the future for that purpose must be the recognition of the genocide of 1915 by Turkey with all of its natural consequences. Obviously Turkey will offer its own conditions. I am aware that this proposal on my part will not create much enthusiasm among Armenians, especially among large segments of the Diaspora Armenians. In the last several decades, Anti-Turkism played a certain role in the preservation of the nation in the Armenian Diaspora. Psychologically it is difficult to return to the realistic and often skillful policy that the Armenian Republic pursued with regard to Turkey in the difficult period of 1918-1920. However, that realistic policy is necessary and time will not wait. Given that we will have only four neighbors, it would be foolish on our part to renounce voluntarily the option of establishing trade ties with one of them and thus limit our prospects of activity. The establishment of trade ties with Turkey does not mean forgetting the genocide of 1915 nor does it mean giving up our historic lands. We will return to this issue later.

International experience shows that the most important raw material for developing an economy and a country in general is human resources. Backward countries which tried to implement national development programs by building steel smelters have remained poor, while countries which spent the money they borrowed from others to train specialists are now making great strides toward general prosperity. No financial means must be spared to educate and train our growing generation and to turn them into specialists. Mandatory education in a modern Armenian national school is of great importance. The system of higher learning must be made autonomous and must establish ties with advanced scientific centers around the world, and a significant

portion of the student body must receive its education in the best universities of various countries. The most productive use of national capital is investing in the training of specialists.

As for military programs, the Soviet army that is in our territory will most probably continue pursuing its strategic objectives during the transition period while we get the opportunity to create our national army. In this regard the Soviet Union may play an important role if it comes to terms with the inevitability of our secession. In the future, if Russia wishes to retain its military bases in our Republic then that should be discussed in separate talks.

As for the general structure of government, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. We have before us the experience of many other national states formed much earlier in time.

We outlined the plans we would like to implement on the path from semi-independence to full independence, but let us see if we will be allowed to become semi-independent. As we already mentioned, the present time is favorable to move toward independence by constitutional means and that course will not allow the Soviet government to use overt pressure against us. But that does not mean that attempts will not be made, through various conspiracies, to hold us back from that course of action. For example, attempts may be made to aggravate the Karabakh problem or to generate Armenian-Azeri clashes on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If that happens the situation may be corrected through military and diplomatic means taking into account the interests and means of the two sides. Economic pressure would similarly not produce any important results. That approach did not work against Lithuania even when implemented overtly. In any event it must be remembered that, given the processes that are in motion in the country and the rapid deterioration of the economy, the economic pressure that may be applied on us will soon become a routine fact of life regardless of what we do. The real danger comes from another side.

A survey of the political situation in the Transcaucasus indicates that the leadership of the Soviet Union has succeeded in neutralizing in one way or another the threats from the national movements in Azerbaijan and Georgia. After decimating the Azeri movement through military force, the Soviet government bribed the people by various means. The biggest bribe is Artsakh. Artsakh is both a bribe and a means of holding off Azerbaijan from centrifugal aspirations. Today there is no longer any significant national movement in Azerbaijan although nobody can predict what will happen there tomorrow. Meanwhile, Georgia's national movement is so divided, the central government has so many means of exploiting the issue of national minorities, and the organizations operating there are so easily fooled by that trick that Georgia also does not worry the leadership of the Soviet Union. The issue of national minorities and the presence of autonomous entities in Georgia allow the

central government to restrain any Georgian aspirations for independence. The Georgian movement shines on the outside but has no depth inside.

The situation is different in Armenia. Our movement, being the first of its kind in the Soviet Union, has retained its unity until now although there has been some fragmentation of forces recently. The most important reason the movement remained united until recently was that it was gathered around a single cause, the issue of Artsakh. Also of importance was an astonishing national attribute which is not very well known and which has taken root in us over the centuries: Unity around any national issue. This is incomprehensible and unattainable for other nations. Now the Artsakh issue can no longer serve as the motivating axis of a national movement although our entire nation is deeply aware that that issue is of vital importance for our future and is prepared to make many sacrifices to resolve that problem permanently. Some day, if it becomes necessary, our people would stand by the side of their sisters and brothers in Artsakh to express their collective repugnance and to defend them against any possible transgressions. Nevertheless, at present the Artsakh issue does not, in general, constitute a focal point for a national movement. One must not look for traitors or conspiracies to explain this situation. There are objective reasons. Most of the people have come to the conclusion that a mass movement can no longer contribute to the settlement of the Artsakh problem and that professional work and statesmanship on the part of a few is necessary. Many have already realized that there are deeper interests that underlie that problem and that the work aimed at strengthening our nation and state does not detract from the Artsakh issue but, on the contrary, enhances our prospects of resolving that issue. If the Artsakh issue cannot be the focal point of a national movement now, then what is going to replace it?

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[Excerpt] Elation with economic and social reforms in an Empire that is sliding into an abyss is meaningless and cannot unite our perceptive people. Replacing the Communist Party with better or national parties and "bad" leaders with "good" ones is perhaps necessary, but it still cannot inspire or unite our people. On the contrary, if there is no final objective then that struggle can only serve to fragment the nation. A major effort in this direction would only produce dismal results. There exists only one issue whose solution is imperative and can truly contribute to the strengthening of our nation. There exists only one goal on whose path the problem of authority—as a means and not objective—can be solved naturally without fragmenting our national unity, a goal which can bring together the Armenians across the world and which can form an axis of movement. That goal is the goal of restoring independent statehood. We may not be deeply aware of it, but Moscow already understands well that we will come to that conclusion sooner or later. That is why the Empire considers our movement the most dangerous in the Transcaucasus. Aware of the

danger, Moscow prefers to turn over the government in our Republic to self-serving people from the past who are unacceptable and disreputed in these new times, so that it will not pass into the hands of the people and the national movement. It prefers to pick the lesser of two evils. It prefers a temporary government with powers to decimate the national movement. Although we often complain about the absence of unity amongst us, the unity that our nation has demonstrated so far—the like of which can be found only in the Baltic republics—intimidates Moscow. Blows from the outside through instigating Armenian-Azeri clashes or economic pressures can only help the unity of our people. They understand this very well in Moscow and are determined to divide and to decimate the movement at any cost.

Attempts will be made—I am convinced soon without even waiting for decisive steps by us—to confuse the people with distortions; to disrepute the movement at least for a short time; to agitate the armed bands and armies which have been formed for no sensible reason in the city and which are controlled by the authorities; to instigate clashes between the armed bands; and to incite the bands to act against the leaders of the movement and even resort to terrorism. The armed bands will be disarmed quickly as soon as the movement is decimated by the force of arms (let us not delude ourselves; that is not very hard for the Soviet army).

To accomplish all these it will be necessary to create antipathy against Armenians among all the peoples of the Soviet Union, particularly the Russians. They were able to attain that objective in Baku by organizing massacres of the Armenian population. They can attain that objective in Yerevan by organizing incidents similar to the one on 27 May again. That is not hard if we consider the prevailing chaos over the accountability and autonomy of the armed bands and realize that every "band leader" who has a third grade education can gather 7 to 10 armed boys around him and can commandeer cars, extort money, take arbitrary decisions about the future of the nation and put the entire nation at risk with his actions with impunity. These bands in Yerevan, nurtured by the authorities, will be terminated as soon as they fulfill the role assigned to them (without even knowing what they are doing). A serious explanatory and organizational campaign must be conducted against the armed bands. The decision of the Supreme Soviet to establish a security council must be implemented quickly, and bands which refuse to subject themselves to this council must be declared illegal. However, all these can be accomplished only if our nation, realizing the danger, demonstrates a determined intolerance against every armed person on this side of the border zone and every offense committed by armed persons against human dignity. Concerted work must also be carried out to articulate our position, problems and actions to the peoples of the Soviet Union, and a favorable public opinion must be created.

We need unity to embark on the path of independence. We can achieve that unity. However, unity does not exist

in the abstract; unity is created only around a lofty ideal and a realizable goal. That goal and ideal is independence.

Our proposed march toward independence by constitutional means raises numerous problems, the most difficult of which appears to be the issue of Nakhichevan (because of its isolated status). Without dwelling on the various options for resolving this truly complex problem let us turn to the Artsakh problem.

To understand the future course of this problem and what we need to do, it is necessary to analyze in detail the entire political history of the Karabakh movement in the previous period. Complex ploys that are incomprehensible to some, a clash of interests and sometimes delicate political maneuvering underlay the tumult, rallies, strikes, massacres and the resolutions passed in Moscow, Yerevan and Baku. There were blows and counterblows. Numerous questions were raised. Was the Karabakh movement fabricated or did it come about naturally? How wise was it to pursue the constitutional path, when the constitutional dead-end created by Article 78 was evident from the outset? Why did Moscow take the side of Azerbaijan? Did we take a correct posture after the Sumgait tragedy? Who organized Sumgait and why? How can one explain the prominent role that the army played in November 1988 in deporting Armenians from Azerbaijan and Azeris from Armenia? Why was the Karabakh Committee arrested and subsequently a special administrative committee was set up in Artsakh? Was the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan against Armenia an immoral act or a smart and effective political measure? Why did the Baltic representatives vote against us in the passing of the 28 November resolution? How can one explain the fact that at the time the Karabakh Committee was arrested a resolution was proposed in the Supreme Soviet to declare Artsakh an inseparable part of Armenia and that we opposed the passage of such a resolution? Why did the Karabakh Committee force the Armenian Supreme Soviet to declare a United Armenian Republic on 1 December? Was that decision correct or flawed? How can one explain the fact that the secretaries of Armenia's raykoms, the directors of factories and the Armenian Central Committee were trying to gain control of the Karabakh movement in the fall of 1989 and to create the impression that the Karabakh Committee was no longer working on the Karabakh issue?

All these and numerous other questions await their conclusion and their political interpretation. One should not look for complex conspiracies. All these questions have simple and reasonable explanations, but the important point is that they are all related to each other, that they are not coincidental and that they form a single political linkage. The answers to the questions posed and the explanations to the said phenomena are enough material for a separate article. As for the future of the issue, let me state briefly that although we must obviously add flesh and bones to the 1 December decision, that decision cannot be put into practice for a long time

to come. Even worse, that decision may be used against us in certain circumstances. That decision and the possible work that can be carried out to put it into practice must for the moment be considered our internal affair and must not be drummed up among outsiders. The Artsakh problem must continue to be presented to the outside world in its natural state, in other words as a problem which stems from the principle of the nation's right of self-determination without associating the issue with Armenia. Artsakh's ability in the last few months to wage its struggle to preserve its identity without Armenia's help is of major political significance. That situation reaffirms to the entire world that the Artsakh struggle is a truly indigenous struggle for its freedom based on the principles of international law mentioned above. These principles of international law are obviously purely abstract and cannot solve any problem on their own if they are not backed by a motivated and strong force. But they are the internationally endorsed principles which cannot be ignored by any state and which form the legal and moral basis of a national liberation struggle. No problem can be solved without a struggle, but brute force is often not enough to attain victory; a favorable public opinion also plays an important role. In this regard let us note that the slogan that we must place our hopes solely on our own strength is obviously true; but that does not mean that we must isolate ourselves artificially and take a posture of having been alienated by everyone. There is no need to move from one extreme to the other.

From a military standpoint, we must take into account realistic prospects and work to turn Artsakh into an unconquerable fortress securing at least its present national status. From economic and political standpoints we must preserve and enhance Artsakh's autonomy considering that the direction in which the Soviet Union is moving currently may be favorable for the realization of that goal (the contradictions unfolding in the center can also be cautiously exploited).

In addition, we must not be taken in by the center's ploy of linking our independence to the Karabakh problem. If we declare independence and remain in a state of semi-independence while waiting for the unfolding of events, our prospects of resolving the Artsakh problem would be enhanced. If we remain within the Soviet Union no new avenues would be opened for resolving that problem.

Any mention of guarantees for the existence of the Armenian Republic brings to mind the dangers of having a neighbor like Turkey. We already noted that if the Soviet Union disintegrates abruptly and uncontrollably there is the danger that Turkey may momentarily swerve from the path of internal development it has chosen and try to seize some easily digestible fragments of the Empire. That is one of the major reasons that propels us to hurry toward gaining independence before such a perilous situation comes about. Everyone agrees that Turkey may try to seize some of the fragments. However many do not agree that Turkey has chosen a path of

internal development which allows for the peaceful coexistence of Turkey and Armenia. These individuals cite as evidence the case of Cyprus. I do not wish to delve into the details of Cyprus. I wish to cite only publicly available documents and let everyone make up his own mind on those facts. Let us only note that the peaceful coexistence of neighboring countries is guaranteed not only by the decisions each state has taken with regard to its internal development and the restraint imposed on the opposite side by military power, but also by international obligations and the interests of many other countries to preserve the equilibrium. Conquests become possible when the edifice of international obligations is disturbed in one way or another, when an unstable situation is created in a region, when revolutions and transformations are launched, when the orientation of the interests of certain countries changes, and when more or less sufficient grounds exist for the use of military force. From that perspective almost all independent states are in the same position; the existence of each is guaranteed by military power, the policies it is pursuing, international obligations and stability in the region. [passage omitted]

There is another issue related to independence that deeply concerns our people: How to bring about the reunification with the Armenian Republic of our historic lands which have been seized by Turkey and which are virtually without any Armenian population today? After all, when our independent statehood is restored, would we not be weaker than Turkey in almost every respect? I do not know. I am sure that if anyone proposes a feasible plan for the reunification of our lands, our entire nation would unite around it and would not spare any sacrifice or effort for that objective. However, I know for sure that the hopes that Russia will some day return to its expansionist policies, that it will seize those lands from Turkey to give them to us and that, then, it will disintegrate as an empire so that we can have a united independent Armenia are entirely unfounded and lead our people to passivity and slavery condemning us to vanish from this world as a nation. Equally unfounded are the hopes that the recognition by the UN of our genocide in 1915 (which is of major significance for our nation) would

lead to the return of our lands to us. At the moment the only hope that I can see is that we must greet unforeseen historical fluctuations which may permit us to resolve our territorial problems as an independent nation and state and not as an ethnic group in the process of being assimilated in Russia. This does not mean that we must forget our territorial demands. It only means that at present these demands cannot be our national and state policy. Those demands must constitute an idea that unifies public organizations and compatriotic associations. They must always be kept alive in the memory of our people, constitute the aspiration of our youth until the opportunity to resolve that issue presents itself. Powerful Germany took the same posture with regard to its reunification.

The British say that they have two powerful weapons: the nuclear bomb and the history of their nation. We do not have the former, and we are not making use of the latter. The time has come for our historians and writers to abandon their propensity to moan and to reminisce about only the tragic pages of our history, thus weakening our people. We have been a strong nation in the past, and we must become strong again. We were considered the best soldiers in the East. We have given to the world our unparalleled architecture. After losing our statehood we entered and gained major influence through peaceful commercial means in India and China. In the British parliament it was said that India cannot be conquered without the collaboration of the Armenians. We stood at the source of the Reformation which transformed Europe and brought it to its present level of civilization. God did not preserve us and carry us through the tribulations of millenia so that we condemn our nation to annihilation today because of passivity and indecision. The timid and the weak should leave the Motherland; they are the dust of our nation. Let the strong stay—those who want to live on their homeland with human dignity, who have faith in our nation's future, who are Armenian by their very existence, who think Armenian and who cling to the heritage of our ancestors, our land, and our water. By joining hands we can once again restore our ancient strength and our state.

ISRAEL

Columnist Examines U.S. Middle East Policy

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15 Oct 90 p 10

[Article by Moshe Jacques]

[Text] They sought to block Saddam Husayn. They concentrated an enormous military force at his border. But instead of pressing the button for the red light, they pressed the one for the green light and unintentionally signalled to Hafiz al-Asad that the way was open for him to swallow up Lebanon.

The Americans did not do this with malicious aforethought. But in retrospect, they helped him formulate the model of the "new order" in the Middle East. It is very doubtful if James Baker explicitly told the Syrian president that he could send his planes to bomb the Presidential Palace in Beirut. He certainly did not give his blessing to the rumbling of Syrian tanks outside the Lebanese Defense Ministry building. But al-Asad saw in his conversation with James Baker a green light for his military initiative. In 1982 the Israeli Foreign Minister drew the conclusion, from the reaction of Foreign Secretary Haig, that he had signalled agreement for Israeli military action, and he got burned. But in 1990 the Syrian president concluded that the U.S. would not get upset about his hegemony over Lebanon, and he came out just fine. The Americans did not condemn him for "the exaggerated means" he used even against civilians, and the proponents of the "new world order" were not moved by the killing he sowed in Beirut.

The Americans are still digging in within the Saudi Arabian desert, but the Syrians have already derived full benefit from their coalition with the Americans. They have succeeded in realizing their dream and taking control of Lebanon. The Americans, who demanded in the past that the Syrian army evacuate Lebanon, did not let out a peep when the Syrian "Sukhoi 24" bombers placed bombs in the Presidential Palace in Beirut. Israel has no reason to be sorry about the removal of General Aoun. That unstable general once agreed to set up missiles supplied to him by Iraq in the area under his control. Israel foiled that plot, and we do not need to shed tears over his demise. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Syrian success in realizing their dream in Lebanon has hurt the prospects for talks between Jerusalem and Damascus. The "green light" that the Syrians saw in the American words freed them from the need to talk to Israel on the issue of Lebanon.

Yasir 'Arafat and his supporters in the Arab world also witnessed American behavior on the issue of Jerusalem as a "green light" for their offensive. The PLO plan to focus their offensive on the issue of Jerusalem was announced back at the beginning of the year by Sa'id Kim'al, the PLO representative in Cairo. He told the Egyptian News Agency about the widespread diplomatic activity initiated by his organization in order to assure

the status of Arab Jerusalem. At the same time President Bush made a verbal blunder and professed himself against Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem. His words set off a storm, and he was forced to retract a bit, but the Arabs did not let the issue die. In May of this year Saddam Husayn convened a congress in Baghdad that declared null and void Israel's claim of Jerusalem as her eternal capital and called for the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of independent Palestine. During the course of several months of preparation for the conquest of Kuwait, Saddam Husayn spoke of "the liberation of Jerusalem from Zionist captivity."

The ruler of Iraq tried to incite the world's Muslims against the Americans' control of the holy places in Saudi Arabia and was unsuccessful, but 'Arafat supplied him with the pretext for the incitement—the bloodbath on the Temple mount. The Americans were frightened and were quick to pacify the Saudis and Syrians, and the shackles were removed from 'Arafat's hands and, indirectly, also from Saddam Husayn's. The Americans felt themselves pressured, and thereby showed weakness. In lending a hand in terms of the condemnation of Israel, for an incident that Israel did not start, they encouraged 'Arafat to challenge Israel in order to force this country to take energetic measures during the time of the stay of the U.N. mission. The U.S. does not want to encourage unrest in Jerusalem, but, in retrospect, the U.S. has been helping do just that.

It is almost certain that the American Congress, that only a few months ago expressed its unequivocal opinion about Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, will not move the scheming for Jerusalem to its agenda. It will manage to express its opinion before the elections in early November. But the Arabists in the State Department are not resting on their laurels either. They have already opened a counteroffensive of near sabotage to bring about a government crisis in Israel. The publication of David Levi's letter to his counterpart, the American Secretary of State, could constitute the push for a government crisis since David Levi did not clarify in his letter Israel's position on the issue of construction in Jerusalem and the absorption of immigrants in Jerusalem. But the need to close ranks at this juncture against other scheming on the issue of Jerusalem will spare the government the crisis. In addition, Levi's letter is not the final word in the negotiations over the American guarantee. This week there will be negotiations over the agreement between a delegation that will come from Washington, and the Israeli government.

The American guarantee of a \$400,000,000 loan is important for Israel, but Jerusalem is more important. It is not enough to repeat that this city is the heart of the nation and the capital of Israel, it is also necessary to know how to fight for her and her status, even when it is uncomfortable to fight against the U.S. and the U.N. It is preferable that the U.S. know at the beginning of the struggle for Jerusalem what Israel's red lines are. That will prevent her from taking steps the Arabs might

interpret as a green light for their offensive. A clear position now will prevent Israel from having to confront the U.S. later.

Fewer Officer Training Slots Available

90AE0025B Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
27 Sep 90 p 11

[Interview with Col. "G", officers' school commandant, by correspondent Yo'av Kaspi; date, place not given]

[Text]

[Yo'av Kaspi] Colonel G, Commander of the Officer's School, why not accept the offer by parents to finance the cost of their children's officer course?

[Col. G] Unlike other armies, in which membership in a certain social or economic class determines who can be an officer and who not, in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], only the most qualified, in terms of their ability, become officers. It seems to me that it would be very dangerous to open up possibilities that would not be based on this one rule. Appreciating the fact that parents are prepared to do almost anything to have their children become officers, you have to remember that such a proposal conceals two additional dangers: a surplus of officers, which would cause problems in the area of placement and inefficiency in the utilization of manpower. By the same token, monetary payment might create too much of an obligation to the paying parents, so that, unintentionally, we might start producing officers from unqualified people.

[Kaspi] What is causing the high rate of competition for an opening in Training Base 1?

[Col. G] Today there are more qualified people, in terms of the statistics, who could become officers but, on the other hand, the need for officers has not grown significantly. Thus, a situation has been created where there are more candidates than spaces. Second, to the credit of the younger generation, it can be said that they want to feel that their function is one of responsibility and significance. Today's youth are mostly the sons of parents who served in the IDF, and they all know the importance of an officer in the IDF.

[Kaspi] Part of the fallout of the war in Lebanon was the refusal to serve on the part of the officers. Why do you think the intifadah has not resulted in a similar phenomenon?

[Col. G] Today's youth show more maturity and know how to distinguish between political views and personal obligations. About six years ago, many of our youngsters could not make the distinction, and those who felt the IDF's presence in Lebanon was unjustified, translated that to the personal level and refused to be officers.

[Kaspi] The tendency today is to send soldiers to the officers course on direct assignment, immediately upon

finishing their preparation. These soldiers lack any kind of command experience. Doesn't that affect the officers' professional level?

[Agmon] The lack of command experience is a significant factor at the beginning of the course, becoming less important toward the end, until in the final analysis it becomes difficult to distinguish between a cadet with squadron commander experience and one lacking experience. The same phenomenon recurs at the beginning of the platoon commander's function: those with previous command experience "land on their feet" more quickly than those who come on direct assignment, but here, too, the gap is narrowed very quickly, and it seems to me that we can afford the price of this early lack of experience.

[Kaspi] Does direct assignment bring us closer to the American West Point model where there is a distinction between an officer and a junior commander?

[Agmon] Not at all. In the IDF, in contrast to most of the world's armies, the central principle is still maintained that you cannot become an officer, at least in the fighting units, until you have gone through the entire recruit track. Furthermore, since the influence of unit commanders on the choice of who goes to the course is great, those who were really good soldiers will make it to the course. Skipping over the junior command functions makes no sense.

[Kaspi] Do you support lengthening the infantry officer course?

[Agmon] As commander of training base 1, I claim that I feel there is no need to lengthen the infantry officers course. If it could be lengthened, then I think it would be preferable for those who go to the course to be squadron commanders for that extra period of time instead, without wasting the extra time on the officers course. The trick is to determine the right set of priorities and get it to fit into the available time. Likewise, there is no room to move to three officer semesters at training base 1, and the existing situation, where there are four infantry officers courses a year, needs to be maintained.

[Kaspi] Will the existing tendency, to require an officer interested in being an infantry platoon commander to sign up for two more years, in your opinion, hurt the readiness to go into the officers course?

[Agmon] I personally am against that tendency. It seems to me that it is an exaggerated, unfair demand. Beyond that, I don't see any need for an additional sign up. The tendency to man the training functions with veteran officers, for whom that is a second function, also does not require an additional sign up. An officer who goes to training base 1 on direct assignment—and today those are about two-thirds of the cadets—finishes the infantry officers course after two years of his IDF service. Thus he has a year remaining to serve as a platoon commander and a year in training functions.

The problem in these functions is the unwillingness of the officers to serve as trainers and not a problem of time. Certainly if the sign up for those who complete the infantry officers course is lengthened, people will be afraid to go to the course.

With all the good we see in the motivation to become officers, there is no positive correlation between the motivation to go to the course and the degree of qualification for the function. Thus, I am afraid that signing up for two years will create a situation in which those who are not as good will go out for the course, and we will be forced to choose officers from among those who are less qualified. In general, precisely those who lack the motivation are the better officers.

Infantry Tactics, Training Discussed

90AE0025A Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
27 Sep 90 p 10

[Interview with Infantry Commander Brigadier General David Agmon by correspondent Yo'av Kaspi; date, place not given]

[Text]

[Yo'av Kaspi] Infantry Commander, Brigadier General David Agmon, why is there a difference in tactics and drills among the various infantry brigades?

[Agmon] The difference results from the fact that the infantry is based on the history of the various brigades since the days of the War of Independence. The Ground Forces Command has its own tactics which are clear. The differences are generally a matter of nostalgia, stemming from the heritage of the brigades. Today we are trying to get to a situation in which the infantry will have unified drills. Straightening things out is being accomplished in meetings between the infantry soldiers in the squadron commander courses, in the officer courses and in the company commander courses. The new infantry training setup, in which there are more meetings, also contributes to unifying tactics. Nevertheless, because the infantry basically requires individual reliability rather than group reliability as with the armored corps, infantry tactics are completely flexible.

[Kaspi] Are you considering a unification of the brigade training bases into a single recruit training base for all infantry soldiers as in the rest of the ground forces?

[Agmon] The idea is currently being staffed. We are looking into that sort of direction, which would allow us to inculcate a unified set of basics and improve the professional level of the infantry soldier under the supervision of the armed command and the Ground Forces Command. But the historical connection between the brigade training bases and the brigades carries a lot of weight. An infantryman, unlike an armored person, is drafted at the induction center into Golani, Giv'ati, etc. and not into the infantry. Therefore, even if the brigade training bases were unified, the process would have to be

carried out within the format of the school for squadron commanders, where there is a separate battalion for soldiers of each infantry brigade.

[Kaspi] Is it easier to be a recruit today because of the strict limitations on hazing, control of hours of sleep, etc?

[Agmon] It is no easier to be a recruit today than in the past. The physical capability of the soldier is better, even though there was more hazing in the past. Today capability and reliability are built using gradual medical models that improve the final level. As a result fewer soldiers drop out of the recruit training today for health reasons than in the past. I don't believe at all in hazing or punishment. Punishment should only be imposed by the court. The tool that the commander has to deal with problems is additional drilling. Even that tool should not be used in the middle of the night or to an exaggerated extent. Commanders must remember that all of us, after all, are human beings, who make mistakes. Nevertheless, commanders today are exposed more to the media, to parents, to the supervision of the senior echelons. The military system is also more sensitive.

[Kaspi] How would you summarize almost two years of operation of the new infantry set up?

[Agmon] The new set up is a technique for preparing the soldier. In the new set up we improved the technique by lengthening the duration of preparation and separating the basic command training (squadron commander course) from the preparation of the commanders themselves in the sergeants course. An infantryman must not be like a duck that knows how to fly, to swim and to walk, but does not do any of them fully. The infantryman is required to have a lot of abilities: aerial, ground and mechanized fighting, in built-up areas, in open areas and in fortified areas, both day and night. Therefore in order to prepare the infantryman, more time is needed. Even the new setup does not answer all the requirements and we are continuing with a gradual process of improvement. Beginning with the next semester, the sergeants course will be extended from six weeks to eight weeks. It may be that even this will not be enough for preparing the junior command, and the course will be lengthened again—in conjunction with the move to three officer semesters a year instead of four, in order to add subjects to the course that there was no time to teach in the past.

[Kaspi] What is the justification for the existence of a basic squadron commander course when, in fact, the course that prepares squadron commanders is the sergeants course?

[Agmon] Every infantryman has to have command potential since he could find himself at the hour of truth in command of a group or an APC [Armored Personnel Carrier]. The personal responsibility required of an infantryman also calls for command capability. We therefore see a need for a basic commanders course for every infantryman, different from the sergeants course, that prepares squadron commanders. In addition, the

basic squadron commanders course contributes to the unification of tactics between brigades and allows us to pass along to the soldiers various topics such as APC's that cannot be passed along at a high level in the framework of the brigade training bases.

[Kaspi] About 70 percent of the training accidents and injuries involve infantrymen. Why?

[Agmon] Those numbers are no different than the relative proportion of infantrymen among the trainees. Nevertheless, the sensitivity and vulnerability of the infantryman are very high. A tank is one vehicle. What is comparable to it in the infantry is the squadron, which contains ten soldiers and therefore, during fire, constitutes ten times the risk. The infantryman operates a lot of different weapons and undergoes the most complicated training. Despite that, the number of infantrymen injured this year declined as compared to previous years. Apart from the accident at Tsalim, in which infantrymen were killed by artillery fire, not a single infantryman was killed this year in a training accident.

[Kaspi] As a result of the disaster in Tsalim, will the infantry battalion commander be afraid to operate artillery in training?

[Agmon] Definitely not! The infantry battalion commander is generally an experienced officer who knows of hundreds of cases in which the artillery was operated with complete success. The accident did not change the need for artillery in wartime. We have to keep things in perspective. One accident occurred, and we have to correct the errors so that it does not recur. If we start drilling in accordance with our fears and not according to need, we will drill differently from the way it happens in wartime. Even now the safety ranges in artillery fire are larger than the ranges they will use in wartime.

[Kaspi] In future battlefields which will be saturated with sophisticated weapons systems, will the infantryman holding a simple rifle still be important?

[Agmon] Battle is made up of many elements, but, in my opinion, the two main components of battle are the assault forces—infantry and armor. All the other forces simply provide support. I do not see a situation in which weapons alone will decide a war, therefore the airman or artilleryman can only help, but not decide the battle. The only absolute weapon is nuclear weaponry, but in a conventional war, the assaulting forces will always be important.

[Kaspi] Is there room for setting up an air force subordinate to the ground forces?

[Agmon] I certainly think that helicopters of all sorts, and a portion of the transport planes, have to be under the command of the ground arm that will be created in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], as in most of the world's armies. Helicopters fight in the battle alongside ground forces. Battle helicopters are, in fact, flying tanks that

carry out armored warfare from above. Other helicopters, as well as transport planes, are used to transfer infantry forces from one place to another and provide supplies to the ground forces. Therefore, I recommend the establishment of a ground arm that would contain planes. Nevertheless, because we are a relatively small army, there is no need for establishing additional systems of preparation and maintenance. Those can stay under air force authority while the pilots are subordinate operationally to the ground forces.

Growth of Islamic Movement Near Tel Aviv

91AE0001A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV (Weekend Supplement)
in Hebrew 14 Sep 90 pp 6-8, 10

[Article by Ben Kaspi]

[Text] On a Wednesday two months ago, at the time of the Muslim evening prayer, someone called the police station in Lod and reported to the desk officer that a murder was about to be committed at the large mosque. A force of policemen and border police hurried to the mosque and found the imam, Muhammad Akram Farah, trembling in fear. "By no means will I enter the mosque," he told them. "Once inside, they will kill me."

Farah was surrounded by young men. The policemen knew them well. Most of them are former criminals or addicts who have recently returned to Islam and are now enthusiastic activists in "a-Nida' al-'Arabi [the Arab Call]" ("Back to Sources [sic]"), which is actually the Lod faction of the extremist Islamic movement led by Shaykh Darwish from Kafr Qasim. The group, led by its local emir (prince), Yusuf Shira'iyah, has viewed the imam with blatant enmity. From time to time, the imam is called by that famous name of disrepute, "SHABAK [General Security Services] snitch." Al-Nida' al-'Arabi (hereafter al-Nida') decided to dismiss the imam of Lod and appoint someone else to replace him.

At the end of that day, the Muslims of Lod did not have an imam. Farah, a young, respected, educated Muslim, and a graduate of an Islamic college in Saudi Arabia, gathered his possessions and fled from the city. It is said that he returned to Bayt Hanina, where he was born.

Two weeks before, he had been attacked by a fanatic Muslim. However, he refused to submit a complaint to the police. Later, someone paid 50 shekels to a drunkard in the area to occupy the imam's regular place in the mosque. Subsequently, another Muslim fanatic struck him in the face. Then the police were called. The police came, but Muhammad Farah submitted to the pressure.

The Chairman of the Islamic Council in Lod, Yusuf Shira'iyah, has news for anyone who thinks that the extremist Islamic movement exists only in Tehran, Gaza, or Qafr Qasim: "Eighty percent of the Arabs in Lod support us. Whoever does not support us, is an informant, or is paid. We are the people. No one can interfere to decide who will be our imam or what happens in the mosque."

Lod, by the way, is ten minutes from Tel Aviv, 100 meters from Highway No. 1, and a stone's throw from the international airport of the state of Israel.

The taking over of the mosque in Lod is an indication of the growing strength of the Islamic movement there. For the first time in Lod's history, the movement put two of its representatives on the municipal council and two others on the workers' council. It is a party that maintains a well-oiled and efficient machine, including a newspaper, day care facilities, youth movements, soccer teams, a "Muslim woman" movement, "the Muslim worker," interest groups, charity institutions, and organizational institutions.

"This reminds me exactly of what was here 60 years ago, when our parents established the state," states a senior security element in the area. "They are organized, disciplined, efficient, and imbued with faith. They absolutely reject the existence of the state of Israel. They want to hear nothing of a secular, binational state. They want to see an Islamic, Khomeinist state here one day. In their current status as a minority, they are maintaining a low profile and not inciting. They are cooperating with the state and hiding their true intention. When they become stronger, gasoline bombs will fly here. In the meantime, they are accumulating strength, influence, and centers of power."

However, they are not having an easy time of it. Al-Nida' is encountering its strongest opposition from an unexpected quarter, the Arab population itself. During the battle over the mosque, for example, the opponents of al-Nida' called in reinforcements from Gaza. Three pickup trucks filled with young Gazans came. Someone called the police, who arrived at the site to prevent a flare-up. The police found axes, hammers, and similar implements in the beds of the pickup trucks. The Gazans had come to help the imam's supporters and the opponents of al-Nida'. Reinforcement from Gaza? What a surprise! How can that be?

In order to understand why, one must become familiar with the delicate, unique weave of the Arab population in Lod: The city is surrounded on the west, north, and east with crowded Arab neighborhoods. This crowdedness has created mixed neighborhoods in which Jews and Arabs live side by side and enjoy good neighborly relations (e.g., in Ramat Eshqol). The origin of the Arabs of Lod is mixed: Some are refugees who were evacuated from Shaykh-Munis in northern Tel Aviv. Others are refugees who came from Yafo, and some are Bedouins who migrated from the Negev. Another large segment has its origins in the many families of Arab collaborators, spies, and others who have aided Israel, who were exposed. These families, which are from the territories, especially Gaza, were brought to Lod by the security authorities. Lod has thus served as a kind of city of refuge for this population since the early 1950s. Each war produced its own small wave of migration, and this process is still continuing. From time to time, an Arab family arrives from Gaza, Nabulus, or Hebron. The

security authorities arrange for their daily needs and a Housing Ministry apartment.

A large portion of the Arabs of Lod are from such families. They are loyal to the state of Israel, and they are strong opponents of the Islamic movement. One such family, which came from Gaza in the 1950s after several of its members were hung in the square of the city for spying for Israel, summoned the pickup trucks. Another Arab of Lod, an elderly man, went around for a long time in the area of the mosque with a large sword, declaring "whoever touches the imam will have to pay." He too, in his youth, was a spy for Israel.

On 13 July of this year, another chapter was recorded in the internal war in Lod. A flier strongly censuring al-Nida' was circulated in the city. The opponents of al-Nida' claim that the flier was distributed by a youth group that had been a member of the Islamic movement, but had become disappointed with it. The following quotes are taken from the flier: "They think that they alone are Muslims, and that they alone have the ability to watch over Muslims, as if they had a monopoly on good deeds. Their principle is that whoever is not with us is against us. This is a dictatorial principle that has no place in Islam. Brothers, is it possible to attack the Muslim imam? Is it possible that a part of this group would create a conflict in the city? Have you asked them where all of their businesses, restaurants, vehicles, and houses come from? Where is the money that has been collected every Friday at the mosque for four years now? Where is the money that is collected in the Arab villages? Where is the money that is collected from Muslims in Lod. This money is for our brothers in the refugee camps in Gaza, the wounded, and the victims? Where is the charity money that is collected, how is the meat that is collected divided? Where are all of the funds that were taken from the workers' council following the coalition with the labor Alignment? Ask them if it is possible for a Muslim to kill his brother in the name of Islam? Ask them if that is possible after the Islamic movement sent one of its youths to run over the imam with a vehicle. Ask them about the funds that were collected for the victims of Rish'on Letziyon. Do they care about Muslims, or do they care about themselves?"

Yusuf Shira'iyah was not particularly excited by the flier. As far as he is concerned, everything is clear, simple, and understood: "The Arab board of trustees is a body appointed by the government. They are plants and do the bidding of government officials. This is a democratic state, and they cannot interfere in religion. The board of trustees is abandoning the Muslim waqf [religious endowment], and it is nullified. Should someone decide for the Jews' rabbinate who should be a rabbi? No. Then why should it be decided for us who will be the imam and what will happen in the mosque? We decided to hold elections, so that Muslims could decide for themselves what is best for them. In May, there were elections in Ramlah, Lod, Yafo, and 'Akko. They were organized very well, and 7,500 voters participated. Each city

elected a board of trustees. Here, a council of ten people was elected." Yusuf Shira'iyah was elected to the top spot of course.

However, according to law, the Finance Ministry appoints the board of trustees. 'Abdallah Abu-Qisq is the chairman of the board of trustees of Lod. There is a chairman and there is a board, but al-Nida' is suddenly disregarding both of them. As far as Yusuf Shira'iyah is concerned, "they are the appointed board, and we are the elected board. They sit in offices, and we work in the field."

Nor does the incident with the imam seem strange to Yusuf Shira'iyah: "The imam must be an educated, Muslim figure who is acceptable to the population and who is a Koran scholar. Farah did not have this ability. People wanted to turn the issue into a matter of principle, but we ultimately understood that we are right, and he left."

Yusuf al-Baz is now serving as the temporary imam. He is a young local, a relative of Shira'iyah, and a central activist in al-Nida'. Shira'iyah: "We will appoint al-Baz to be imam and nothing will change that. Anyone brought in from outside would not be equal to al-Baz in terms of education and would not be acceptable to us." Here too, Shira'iyah ignores the painful fact that, according to the law, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, not he, appoints the imam. The ministry has already received a letter from the director of the security department of the municipality of Lod, Tzvi Elon. Elon recommends against the appointment of al-Baz, because he belongs to an extremist faction. The mayor of the city, Maqsim Levy, also opposes his appointment, as do some members of the board of trustees, and all opponents of al-Nida'. However, al-Baz continues to serve as imam.

Shira'iyah strongly denies the extremism that is attributed to his party. Samir al-Wahidi, a young man who has become a religious Muslim and an enthusiastic member of al-Nida', is somewhat less moderate: "Our only desire is that our religion not be touched. The government is pressuring us too much. This will ultimately explode. It is a question of time. Who is Maqsim Levy to dictate to us who will be the imam here? The Shah of Iran also fell because he exerted too much pressure on the people. The Muslims of Afghanistan succeeded in humiliating Russia, which is a superpower. Everything will be fine if the Muslims are permitted to manage their own religious affairs."

Al-Wahidi, incidentally, was a known criminal and drug addict. Now, after becoming religious, he claims that his life has changed. He is living proof of the supremacy of religion over governmental mechanisms. "No detoxification institution will succeed in controlling drugs and crime, only Islam can," it is said in al-Nida'. Al-Wahidi: "Since I repented, I can be found at home, at the mosque, or on my way between them. I am a new man. They brought people with swords and axes here to

frighten us. If I were not religious, we would go out and pluck out their bones. However, religion does not believe in violence."

"True, they are not violent, acknowledges Marwan (a bedouin name), one of the opponents of al-Nida'. Marwan, an educated, Arab resident of Lod, states: "They are much worse. They will not attack you physically. However, they will spread rumors about you, as they spread about the imam, saying that he is a SHABAK collaborator. We suffer them in silence. They are fanatics. No one is neutral in their view. Either you are with them or against them. On the whole, they are very simple people, from very low socio-economic levels, former criminals. They emphasize style and dress, not content. Our religion is very humble, and they are making it into a caricature. They have divided the people into the fit and the unfit. To be considered fit, you must grow a beard, attend the mosque for a long period, and dress like them. They hate people who are educated. They like you if you come from below. Most of them are as such."

"From a religious standpoint as well," states Marwan, "they are controversial. There is great skepticism about what they understand religion to be. They speak worse than Rabbi Shakh. They cite strange religious quotes, all kinds of sayings [of the prophet and his companions]. No one knows if these sayings really exist. We have gradually come to understand that they are not just a social movement. Rather, they want to take control of the city. A special hierarchy has developed among them. They are seeking 'yes men' who will do their bidding. Therefore, they shrink from educated and independent people. They therefore tried to get rid of the imam, who was independent and did not wish to dance to their tune."

"The big problem is that they are cut off from reality. They ignore state institutions. How is it possible to maintain coexistence in this way? This is a mixed state. There is no autonomy here. They have inflated self-confidence. However, it is not based on anything. They use religion as a means to achieve their ends. For example, their claim that the imam was not sufficiently educated is nonsense. He is a great scholar, a graduate of a prestigious Islamic college, orthodox, classical, and learned. But they tossed him out because he is not sufficiently extremist."

The flier that was published in July, under the auspices of al-Nida', signalled the start of a battle for survival for opponents of the movement. They understood that if they did not oppose it, there would not be another chance. Following the flier, a wave of rumors censuring the Islamic party spread in Lod. Interesting questions began to spring up: From where did members of al-Nida' acquire most of the stores on Hertzog Street in the urban market? How did they recently acquire cars for themselves? Where is the money that is collected every Friday from worshippers in the large mosque?

With time, many young Arabs in Lod are coming to realize that this is a war for survival. Two local young men, Ahmad and 'Adil (bedouin names), state: "They wanted to control the imam. Initially, they liked him. He worked together with Shira'iyah in dividing the resources, and he received a rental apartment. Everything was good and fine. However, later, the imam became too independent. He refused to give sermons about the intifadah. He did not want to take orders. He did not want to talk as [Muslim religious leaders are talking] in Taybah and Qafr Qasim. How could he, inasmuch as Lod is a mixed city? He also did not agree to constantly speak out against Christians and compare them to the Crusaders. Al-Baz, whom they have installed, barely has seven years of education, and they say that he is more educated than the imam. What a joke."

According to the opponents, al-Nida' wants to gain control of Lod. The board of trustees is failing to put up serious opposition. Al-Nida' has in fact gained control of the mosque, the office of the board of trustees, and the library. "The board of trustees are worthless. They are unable to stand up to them."

Marwan, the local intellectual: "Al-Nida' symbolizes extremist fanaticism and the blind following of a handful of former criminals who have become religious. They are cunning, slippery, united, and dangerous. In my opinion, Lod is sitting on a time bomb, a barrel of explosives. They are causing terror to reign in the area. I fear the outcome and the future. I do not fear for the Jews. I fear for us, the Arabs, myself. I also fear the Jews' response that will come after the explosion."

[Box on p 8]

A Delicate Balance

About 11,000 of Lod's 48,000 residents are Arab. The Arab population is concentrated in neighborhoods that surround Lod: the Harakevet [Railroad] Neighborhood, Pardes Snir, Neve-Yereq, the SH [No. 68] Neighborhood, and Ramat Eshqol (mixed). In 1985, there were 304 Arab infants and 762 Jewish infants, although Arabs constituted only 17 percent of the population. It is currently estimated that the numbers of Jewish and Arab infants in Lod are almost equal.

"The weave of common existence is very delicate," states Lod Police Chief Superintendent, Aharon Tal. "It is very difficult to participate in demonstrations, scream 'slaughter the Jews,' and then go home, when your next-door neighbors are Jews."

After the murder in Rish'on Letziyon, there was relative quiet in Lod. In the evening, the residents of Neve-Yereq saw a detailed report on the MABAT television news program about the riots in Taybah. "By God we are suckers" they said to themselves, and they went out to the street. The residents blocked roads, they set trucks on fire, and they threw rocks. A local police commander was injured while dispersing them. The next morning, it

became clear that the misfortune was not so terrible: 13 of the 16 who were arrested were identified as active criminals. The residents expressed their regret and made peace with the police.

By contrast, the walls of the Harakevet Neighborhood are covered slogans that would rival those in the alleys of Gaza. According to local commentators, the severe distress of the neighborhood is the main reason for the relative nationalism there. Several months ago, a Jewish watchman of the Hashmirah [guard] Company was attacked in the neighborhood with rocks and sticks. He was saved by the skin of his teeth.

More than a year ago, a day care center in the Neve-Yereq neighborhood, which is next to the local mosque, was named after an officer in the PLO who was killed by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] in Operation Avivim. Charges were filed against the persons responsible for the act.

In recent days, a bitter "war of loudspeakers" has broken out between members of the Islamic movement and "victims of the loudspeakers" in Lod and the surrounding area. The dispute is over the high volume of the mosques' loudspeakers. According to a Jewish complainant, this is a war of nerves being waged by the Muslims. Residents of the city and the nearby moshavim have complained about the use of loudspeakers at high volume in the early morning, because they disrupt the sleep of children. The municipality brought in experts who set up sound measuring devices. It emerged that the sound from the loudspeakers in fact registered above the allowed decibel level. However, in the meantime, the loudspeakers continue to scream.

[Box on p 10]

There Are Dervishes As Well

"The secret of the success of al-Nida'," states one of its opponents, "is its social aspect. The municipality demolishes a building, and they rebuild it at their own expense. Maqsim Levy, the mayor of Lod, destroys a wall, they provide financing to its owner to rebuild it. Every charity case or needy person finds a solution or help from them. This is especially so regarding those who are close to them. It truly is a welfare institution. Therefore, there is a great trend moving in their direction. They are a source of extraordinary identification. They have stores that sell to the needy at below cost prices. Where does this money come from? No one knows. Jordan and Iran are mentioned. Meanwhile, they are acquiring property and influence."

Al-Nida' al-'Arabi is not the only Islamic movement in Lod. Recently, a neighborhood in the city, Pardes Snir, has witnessed the appearance of a new, small, especially extremist faction of a movement based in the Arab village of Bayt Ghawr al-Tahta in Samaria. The [members of the] movement are called dervishes, and are characterized by total opposition to any kind of violence of any type. The members of the movement are the most

extremist Muslims. They do not at all believe in the life of this world. They dress in white, grow thick beards, speak in whispers and pray at night. They are not interested in, or concerned about, the temporal world. Their only concern is obtaining their next meal, nothing more. They observe a strict prohibition against manifesting violence, even by allusion.

Not long ago, an order was issued to demolish the house of one of the dervishes. When he was told that his house was to be destroyed, he responded in a whisper: "Be my guest, come, destroy it, there is no problem." They came, destroyed, and there was no problem.

New Cross-Green Line Housing in Jerusalem

91AE0038A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
16 Oct 90 p 12B

[Article by 'Elana Baum]

[Text] In the municipality of Jerusalem there is satisfaction over the Cabinet's resolution on immigration whereby 36,000 new apartment units will be built in the capital, 14,000 of them in the new neighborhoods across the Green Line.

The Cabinet decision is based on existing programs in the municipality of Jerusalem for about 10,000 apartments that have already gone through all the necessary bureaucratic hoops. About 4,000 of them are already under construction in the neighborhoods of Pisgat Ze'ev and Neve Ya'aqov in northern Jerusalem. There is a possibility of building another 1,000 units in that area (two neighborhoods across the Green Line).

In the neighborhood of Manhat (known by the name Malha) and in the center of the city there is an authorized program for building 900 apartment units including "Build Your Home." In Giv'at Masu'ah, near 'Ir Ganim, there is a potential for building 900 additional units. Exactly 2,400 units were authorized for construction in Rekhes Shu'afat for the Ultra-Orthodox community (also across the Green Line).

In addition to those units which, as we said, have already gone through all phases of planning and authorization, there is the intent to set up a huge neighborhood on "Har Hahomah" (across the Green Line) near kibbutz Ramat Rahel. That neighborhood will contain 4,800 apartments.

This week the Local Cities Construction Committee decided upon and authorized the inclusion of the "Har Hahomah" neighborhood among the neighborhoods to be built more rapidly. The land in the area belongs by and large to the Keren Kayemet Leyisra'el and in part to kibbutz Ramat Rahel.

In Pisgat Ze'ev a project has been planned, but not yet authorized, for 1,600 apartments for Ultra-Orthodox families.

In addition to these programs, Jerusalem is getting ready for an emergency: Near the Hadassah-'Ayn Kerem hospital (within the Green Line), about 2,000 units can be built for immigrants, under rapid construction. Those lands were once given to the hospital to build housing for the medical corps.

Likewise, a plan is being consolidated to facilitate the set up of several hundred trailer homes in the city.

"When the two bulldozers 'Ariq Sharon and Tedi Qoleq cooperate, there is no doubt that something will move," they will tell you in the city.

Avraham Khila, the city's deputy mayor for housing issues, characterizes the Cabinet decision: "If the Qubersqi Committee does not authorize an expansion of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries to include lands up to Mevaseret Yerushalayim, it will be impossible to build about 40,000 apartment units. The housing potential in Jerusalem in the present situation is only 20,000 apartment units to be built over four years."

Nevertheless, he notes that even if the Housing Ministry increases the construction rate from 5,000 to 10,000 units this year, there would be no problem.

Over the last five years there was almost no national-public housing in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem's population today numbers about 140,000 non-Jews and about 350,000 Jews. About one third of them, 120,000 residents, live in neighborhoods that were built after the Six Day War.

Jerusalem's jurisdictional boundaries since 28 June 1967 also include the neighborhoods built after the Six Day War: Ramot 'Eshkol, Ramot, Ma'alot Dafna, Neve Ya'aqov, Hagiv'ah Hatzorfatit, the expanded Sanhedriah, Pisgat Ze'ev and Gilah.

LEBANON

Sunni Shaykh on Seeking Help From Unbelievers

91AE0010B Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic 1 Oct 90 p 33

[Interview with Shaykh Husayn Ahmad Shahhadah, secretary of African Islamic Unity Organization, by 'Ali Badr-al-Din: "When the Supreme Messenger Sought Help From the Jews of Banu Qaynuqa"—Bold Legal Opinion by Shaykh Husayn Ahmad Shahhadah on Gulf Crisis"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are AL-SHIRA' introduction]

[Text] The decision of the Arab Gulf countries to seek help from foreign military forces to protect their countries from possible Iraqi attack on their territory has provoked reactions from various Islamic religious authorities—reactions exemplified by the issuance of conflicting religious fatwas.

To throw more light on this problem, we met Shaykh Husayn Ahmad Shahhadah, secretary of the African

Islamic Unity Organization and a member of the Central Committee of the World Society of Descendants of the Prophet. The following conversation took place:

[Badr-al-Din] After Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries decided to seek help from American and other forces, the question was raised for consideration in Islamic law. This provoked open conflict between the fatwa of Imam al-Khaw'i in Iraq and the fatwa of the shaykhs of al-Azhar in Egypt. How do you explain this?

[Shahhadah] Before I answer this question, I recall a debate between Imam al-Awza'i, who was from the school of text (*nass*) and tradition (*hadith*), and Abu-Hanifah, who was from the school of personal opinion (*ra'y*). The debate concerned the question of an enemy's using the children of Muslims to protect himself. Imam Abu-Hanifah thought it no sin for Muslims to shoot at the enemy with catapults and arrows, even if the enemy made use of Muslim children. Imam al-Awza'i, however, took a position on the question forbidding Muslims from shooting at the fighters, so as to preserve the children and save their lives. This type of legal disagreement recurs today in a crucial issue of ours burning on the sands of the Gulf. Koranic texts prohibit taking foreigners as friends, in the sense of submitting to their control and influence. Some jurists think that the friendship forbidden is seeking help from polytheists and nonbelievers. However, our knowledge of the exceptions to this rule and its object shows that the reasons for the contradiction between al-Azhar's fatwa and al-Najaf's arise from disagreement over the object of the rule and over diagnosis of its sources. There is no disagreement between them over the Koranic text. The question of seeking help from foreigners can take two forms:

1. One can seek help from peace-loving nonbelievers against hostile nonbelievers. Such seeking of help is unanimously accounted permissible. Historians and commentators have recorded that the Prophet Muhammad made an alliance with the tribe of Khuza'ah and sought help from them although they were polytheists. He sought help from Safwan Ibn-Umayyah, before the latter became a Muslim, to fight Hawazin. He also sought help from the Jews of Banu Qaynuqa' and allotted them a certain sum of money. Support for this may be found in the tradition, "God helps this religion through men who have no share [of religion]."

2. One can seek help from nonbelievers to fight Muslim wrongdoers and tyrants. Some jurists permitted this, because one is seeking help from them to make right prevail, not to promote injustice. They stipulated two conditions for the permissibility of this: a) that there be extreme necessity; and, b) that Muslims be safe from any harm that might be done by those whose help they seek against others. They must be confident that they can be trusted and will not betray. Otherwise, Muslims may not use those who lead astray as help. The Prophet gave expression to this when he said, "I do not seek help from polytheists against polytheists"—in other words, if these two conditions are not met.

In discussions of legal proceedings and lawsuits, we sometimes find jurists propounding the view that the party with a valid claim may seek help from an unjust person in order to obtain his right, if that is his only recourse, insofar as no other means can be found. It makes no difference whether the claim be a debt or tangible property, because it is permissible (and indeed may be a duty) to ward off harm from oneself.

Now, amid the throng of legal opinions dealing with the Gulf crisis, we must review the history of Islamic jurisprudence and the many problems with which it has dealt. These problems still require further consideration by jurists in order to remove Islamic jurisprudence from the arena of political exploitation, formulate a new international [Islamic] jurisprudence, and define the features of a contemporary Islamic policy. In this way, jurists will not fall under any external influence. There are new criteria that must be present in the person of the jurist and in his institutional system. Political investigations of events and an information center will become necessary factors for the soundness of the political fatwa. The latter must be unified within a framework that safeguards and guarantees its independence and influence. While jurists may disagree on questions of ritual observance, social conduct, and personal status, they should not disagree on a political position, given the importance of the matter for the destiny and future of the [Islamic] nation. The time has come to formulate preliminary characteristics in tune with the rising of the Islamic political dawn and its coherent project. One must give the legal method an authentic foundation and crystalize its rules and structures, bearing in mind the social environment of the Islamic movement, in order to find the right direction to take toward knowledge of the principles of legislation. Let us look at the golden age of political fatwas, which were stronger than the swords of ambitious attackers.

Note that in the age of Islamic purity, jurists' fatwas used to break across artificial boundaries. In their sanctity, they crossed every barrier of legal school and geography and thus proved their essential connection to the pure springs of Islam. How often have Iranians, Turks, Indians, and Pakistanis responded to the fatwa of an Arab authority or Arab jurists in Iraq or Egypt! How often have Arabs responded to fatwas by jurists in India or Iran!

[Badr-al-Din] Should we consider helping Kuwait a religious duty?

[Shahhadah] Helping a believer against a believer is a religious duty according to Imam al-Sadiq. However, this help is conditioned within the normal channels. In other words, one should not as a result fall into any danger of clearly violating the following unambiguous Koranic text: "And do not lean toward those who do wrong, lest the Fire touch you—you have no protectors apart from God—and then you will not be helped" [Koran, 11:113]. The meaning of "leaning" toward something is "relying" on it.

[Badr-al-Din] Do you believe we are facing a real cold war? In your view, does this war find its legitimacy in Islamic jurisprudence?

[Shahhadah] The increasing tension in the Gulf region constitutes a challenge to the Arab nation and tests the extent of that nation's ability to make use of time that is going to waste. In particular, the enemy is betting today not so much on division of the Arab will as on the slowness of the wheels of that will in facing the problems that confront it. A cold war requires rapid movement—rapidity accompanied by patience and vigilance in the area of mobilization, rapidity of movement to follow up any incident, and rapidity of maneuver in the fields of political confrontation.

The Koran terms this rapidity *murabatah* [readiness, being at one's post on the enemy's border], as in the verse: "O believers, be patient, and outdo others in patience; be ready, and fear God, in order that you may succeed" [Koran, 3:200]. If *murabatah* lasts more than 40 days, jurists consider it *jihad* [holy war]. It doesn't matter whether those in readiness deploy along the borders to scout out and discover the enemy's intentions or actually to encounter a possible attack. *Murabatah* is analogous to a *jihad* in defense of the territory, people, and property of Islam. *Murabatah* becomes obligatory when the conditions stipulated for it become present, even if the nation is being ruled by an unjust commander or a tyrant. This is because its goal is to protect the existence of Islam, not the regime. The conflict is about religious identity. The sharp conflict over oil resources is not so much concerned with the individual ruler as it is related to the destiny and sovereignty of the [Islamic] nation.

[Badr-al-Din] Those who follow the Gulf crisis note that people in the Islamic movement are clearly in a quandary. Do you expect the Islamic awakening to confront the Gulf crisis with a new political theory?

[Shahhadah] Given the fragmented nature of Arab reality, the first problem that faces us when we battle areas of political backwardness is the problem of the interaction between the governing authority and the nation. A political theory must be primarily concerned with removing the barriers that separate the regime and its base, so that the people may obtain what they need for freedom and may participate in determining their destiny. The role of the people increases when it harmonizes with the role of a government committed to the goals of the [Islamic] message and the welfare of the people. This solidarity becomes a cohesive front that proposes bold positions and sacrifices and that raises everyone to his proper place in the movement of history. Improvisation and anarchy must be avoided. Consideration must again be given to rendering effective the political and organizational bodies that cannot wrestle with the other bodies in the absence of learned thought, the spirit of consultation, and planning.

We should ponder the following fact from the history of the development of the scientific and philosophical movement among Muslims: Political science did not receive the same attention as other subjects. This was because the theory of governance and politics in Islam was surrounded by red lines that were not to be violated or approached due to doctrinal considerations on the part of one group of Muslims or due to other considerations having to do with the fact that revolutionaries and reformers for many centuries burned themselves with the subject.

It was as if the theory of governance and will was always within the forbidden zone that the movement of change did not affect. It became difficult for [Islamic] political theory to develop as a language, a discourse, and a project outside of the closed texts. This made it inadequate for confronting the [modern] age and its changes. Conscious of this, the Islamic awakening can turn its attention again to producing a contemporary political theory through a bold, direct critical reading of our Arab political reality.

The Arab nation today must arise vigorously to think about the future and become ready for sudden crises and emergencies. It is time for it to monitor realistically the dangers that surround it and to focus its eyes on coming days, so that it can forge its strength with its own hands.

Christian Views on Al-Ta'if Agreement Analyzed

91AE0010A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
3 Sep 90 pp 22-23

[Article by Edmond Dahir: "Maronite Secretiveness and Doubleness in Position"]

[Text] Among Christian notables in East Beirut there is a deep-rooted belief that approval of the constitutional reforms has become a settled matter because it constitutes the natural result of the political defeat that has befallen the Christians, particularly the Maronites, in the course of the 15 years of crisis—a trial whose chapters have still not ended.

These notables, each within the zone of his prominence and influence, have withdrawn into themselves to take stock and clarify the hidden shortcomings and motives that led to this situation, "implicitly unacceptable" to a considerable number of Christian leaders.

The most dangerous phenomenon gaining ground today is "doubleness" and a return to reliance upon "secretiveness." In other words, what is made known, said, and announced is the opposite of what is done, plotted, and planned. This is a weapon on which Christians have historically relied, on the principle of "limiting losses as much as possible."

In the belief of the great mass of Christians, the al-Ta'if agreement is acceptable because it represents a possible limit to losses. It is accepted out of self-interest, not out of conviction. This means that any Christians who have

accepted this agreement have done so only because their self-interest dictates it and because any rejection of the agreement will bring new complications and perhaps more damage to Christian interests and safeguards than the damages of the al-Ta'if agreement. They have agreed to give up the prerogatives specified by the National Reconciliation Pact in order not to be forced to make more concessions later and embark upon greater steps than those now being demanded from them.

Presidential Farm

One group of Christian leaders sees the following as the most important of the many factors that led to al-Ta'if:

First, most if not all Maronite presidents failed to steer the government of the country properly. They managed the country's affairs and resources as if the country were a farm to be utilized and exploited. This behavior (the "logic of the farm") was able to replace the "logic of the state."

Second, there is the disparity in economic, social, educational, and cultural levels between one area and another in Beirut and outlying areas.

Third, there is the numerical disparity. In the 1932 census, Christians outnumbered Muslims. Today, this base has changed, and Muslims have come to outnumber Christians.

Fourth, the Christians have had no appreciation of Arab issues—from the Nasirist decade during the days of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue.

Fifth, some Christians have bet on Israel in the conflict that has gone on from 1975 to the present.

Sixth, there is the intra-Marionite conflict that in practice began in June 1978 after the notorious Ihdin massacre and culminated in the events of East Beirut between General Michel 'Awn and Dr. Samir Ja'ja' that began last January 31st and have still not ended.

Seventh, there has been an absence of an effective role of spiritual leaders, especially the role of Bkirki, which used to be considered a safety value not only for Christians but for all Lebanese.

These and other reasons have naturally pushed Christians to accept the agreement of Lebanese parliamentarians—from fear, not conviction—because it is the agreement that accords them a minimum of losses and concessions that they must pay to the Muslims, now that they have emerged from events of the past 15 years in defeat, and in light of the reasons and causes just mentioned.

One may thus say that the agreement was not the preferred option among Christians—Maronites, to be exact. It was the "best of evils" open to them, given that the following options were and still remain offered to them:

—Emigration once and for all to Canada, the United States, Australia, Europe, or the countries of Latin America.

—Accepting reality as embodied by the National Reconciliation Charter, which has Arab and international support.

—Continuing the fighting and violence, but from an unequal position, which will sooner or later lead inevitably to more general and more comprehensive concessions.

Are the Maronites bowing to this outcome?

Three currents of opinion are contending for the Maronite grass roots in the country:

The first holds that Lebanon is no longer a homeland that provides real safeguards for a continued free Christian existence in this East on its basis. Although al-Ta'if constitutes an agreement that "limits Christian losses," it implicitly establishes the formula of "numerical democracy," which was and still is advocated by the Shiite Supreme Islamic Council's deputy chairman, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din. This means that the numerical majority must rule the minority. This is democratic logic, unobjectionable as far as its outward logic is concerned; however, Christians who cling to the logic of privileges reject it because it means the subjection of Christians—the minority—to the rule of Muslims—the majority. This in their view would mean elimination of the distinguishing character of coexistence for which Lebanon has been noted. It would turn the Christians in Lebanon into a minority with the same standing as the Christian minorities in the other Arab countries. This growing feeling is pushing people in this current of opinion to emigrate once and for all from Lebanon. They believe that al-Ta'if is merely an interim settlement; civil war will inevitably break out again in the near future, and the Muslims will demand greater guarantees in the government and larger concessions from the Christians.

The second current of opinion is betting on the outcome of the Middle East crisis. It considers al-Ta'if to be merely a proposal for a temporary settlement, one that will quickly change and evaporate as events take their course in the Middle East. If a solution comes, a new Lebanon will emerge from it, and its features and the features of its political makeup will become clear in accordance with the course of the general solution in the region. Although a solution will be difficult in the near future, the convulsion shaking Lebanon has begun to shake the region. It will inevitably lead to the emergence of a new reality and perhaps to political and geographic changes difficult to predict in their dimensions and outcomes.

The third current of opinion holds that there is no fear for Christian existence in Lebanon under any circumstances and considerations, since the al-Ta'if agreement, with its strong Arab and international support, has

endorsed the custom, followed since 1943, of restricting the three top offices to Maronites, Shiites, and Sunnis. This means that the presidency has been firmly guaranteed to the Christians—the Maronites, to be exact—until further notice. There is therefore no reason for anxiety, despair, or despondency.

However, supporters of this current number no more than 10 percent of the Maronites in Lebanon. Supporters of the first current number about 53 percent—a frightening percentage that calls for dismay. It has caused the Vatican and its representative in Beirut, Ambassador Msgr Pablo Ponte, to sound an alarm, warning of heavy Christian emigration from Lebanon.

How will the Maronites face this reality?

To date there are no remedies. There are studies, or rather there is stocktaking about the condition that the situation of the Maronites in Lebanon has come to.

There are those who worry about the spontaneous reactions that appear among every minority that feels "targeted." Some people notice in the behavior of the Maronite deputies and Christian notables toward al-Ta'if a strong return among their ranks to the logic of "doubleness" and "secretiveness," as demonstrated by the fact that some of them are stating the opposite of what they think, and thinking the opposite of what they proclaim. This is a logic that strengthens the feeling of rejecting everything that is taking place on the ground or behind the scenes. Given an opportunity, this rejection will explode in a rebellion against the entire reality and everyone involved with it. Some Christian "experts" even compare the mood of the majority of Maronites to that which prevailed before the great popular explosion that Eastern Europe witnessed last year. Naturally, they recognize numerical, political, geographical, and structural differences.

It should be noted that the group that prefers to put off emigrating while waiting for the features of a solution to the Middle East crisis to become clear is trying to improve its situation and strengthen its staying power and persistence by advocating broadened decentralization that would afford some guarantees and compensate for the concessions made so that the al-Ta'if agreement process could proceed toward positive results. There are those who are asking spiritual institutions such as Bkirki, al-Kaslik, and others to play a role in strengthening the Christian presence in Lebanon by embarking on the implementation of essential projects. These should at least include guaranteeing education to all, free medical care, housing, a job, and old-age insurance.

If such projects were implemented under the auspices of the Maronite patriarchate or in the context of broadened decentralization, they would satisfy the required purposes and would therefore compensate the Christians for some of the concessions they have offered.

Christians and Maronites

It is being said in fact that this view does not include the Orthodox, the Greek Catholics (Melkites), and other Christian minorities, since al-Ta'if granted the non-Maronite Christians guarantees—or rather "affirmations." In particular, Maronite influence on power and control of the land are to be limited, and certain gains are guaranteed that these Christians have long been trying to realize either in the direction of endorsing guarantees of their influence in the government or strengthening and increasing them.

A large number of non-Maronite Christians used to agree with Islamic leaders who were demanding a limit and reduction of the special privileges granted to Maronites in the government, as well as of Maronite domination in many sensitive departments of the state. At the same time, however, these people want a continuation of the special free Christian role in Lebanon. They see al-Ta'if as an agreement to strengthen participation in government, not do away with it.

If non-Maronite Christians are given a choice between the 1943 formula and the al-Ta'if agreement, they will certainly be strongly for the latter. They are for any formula that limits Maronite domination, but strengthens the Christian presence. They are against any formula that propounds "numerical democracy," i.e., "domination by the majority over the minority."

This buried resentment smoldering in the hearts of non-Maronite Christians against the Maronites can be traced to a number of basic reasons. The most important of these are:

First, the Maronites have classified themselves as Christians of the first and superior rank; other Christians are of the second, third, or lower ranks.

Second, from 1943 to the present, Maronites have dominated the government. Their tyranny has been embodied on the land, in monopolizing the resources of Christians, and in deputizing for them by force and compulsion, not by dialogue and democracy.

Third, Maronite leaders have made fatal mistakes whose results have been borne by Christians of all sects without their having a say in everything that has happened and is happening. For 15 years, year after year, these leaders have launched wars—sometimes in the name of Lebanon and the Lebanese, sometimes in the name of defending a threatened Christian existence, sometimes in the name of the Christian community, and in the name of other glittering slogans. In the end, most of the victims who fell in the wars of the Maronites and in the name of their interests and competition for power were non-Maronite Christians.

One can thus say that other Christians feel satisfied about how the al-Ta'if agreement has curbed the Maronites, with their special guarantees and privileges in the

government and country, their unacceptable domination, and their sectarianism and superiority that ended by becoming a deadening caste. On the other hand, they feel worried that the Christian presence in Lebanon has become an issue. Christians fear that in the future their role, their freedom, their influence, and their special prerogatives will be limited. In their councils, they are stating that the al-Ta'if agreement has the merit of limiting Maronite influence in Lebanon, but [they are also saying,] "We fear that this will be the prologue to ending our existence as free Christians in Lebanon."

Are these fears warranted?

The importance of al-Ta'if lies not so much in texts as in practice. This is what must begin today, without any delay, in order to reflect the degree of success of this formula that does not give the Christians what they want, but at the same time does not give the Muslims what they want. Rather, it constitutes a mutual agreement on a minimum for the establishment of a new Lebanon.

INDIA

Congress-I Meeting Passes Political Resolution

91AS0098A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
15 Sep 90 p 4

[Article: "CWC(I) [Congress Working Committee(I)] Blames Centre for 'All-Round Deterioration'"]

[Text] New Delhi, 14 Sept. The Congress(I) Working Committee [CWC(I)], in a review of the state of the nation at a six-hour meeting here today, blamed the National Front Government for what it termed an all-round deterioration on every front and a sharp increase in the threat to India's integrity and unity.

In a 3,000-word political resolution analysing the major problems before the nation—Punjab, Kashmir, Assam, Sri Lanka Tamils and the rise of divisive and communal forces—the CWC(I) said the National Front Government had, in a few months of rule, split the country, shattered its unity, and aggravated every crack and every divide.

But beyond asserting that the Congress(I) could not allow this to continue and asking all Congressmen and women to stand together in building a new India, the CWC(I) threw little light on how the Congress(I) would like to deal with the crises facing the nation. The lengthy resolution read in parts like an election manifesto.

The CWC(I) blamed the National Front Government for the absence of a policy on Punjab but asked by reporters what the Congress(I)'s own prescription for the troubled State was, the party spokesman, Mr V.N. Gadgil, said it was not possible to express a view unless the Government spelt out its mind.

Total impotence: The CWC(I) accused the National Front Government of total impotence in the face of the gross incompetence and criminal negligence of the AGP [Assam People's Council] Government in Assam. The composite culture of Assam had received body-blows from which it would take decades to recover.

On Kashmir "the nation was burdened with the enormous task of wooing back the sullen, alienated and deeply wounded people" of the Valley. In Sri Lanka disaster was imminent unless the authorities took decisive and concerted action, the CWC(I) said.

In the process of sorting out its internal problems, the National Front, it said, had plunged the nation into four wholly unnecessary civil confrontations. Caste based confrontations, communal confrontations and the North-South divide over language had got accentuated under National Front rule.

Sadbhavana Yatra: The CWC(I) finalised a plan of action for a Sadbhavana Yatra to be launched on Gandhi Jayanti Day (October 2) and to continue till the end of October. It would involve lakhs of people and would be spearheaded by Mr Rajiv Gandhi.

In a resolution on the Gulf crisis, the CWC(I) called for alternative arrangements for the supply of oil and for mobilising people to bring about its solution. It also sharply criticised the Government for the unprecedented rise in prices of essential commodities.

All members of the CWC(I) as well as the Chief Ministers of Congress(I) ruled States attended the meeting.

Commentary Condemns V.P. Singh's Reservation Policy

90AS0453A New Delhi *DINMAN TIMES* in Hindi
2-8 Sep 90 p 4

[Editorial: "B.P. Mandal and V.P. Singh"]

[Text] Ruling and opposition members of the parliament, crossing the party lines, united for a good national common cause when they made the Radio and TV independent by getting past the maze of amendments and counter-amendments and unanimously passing the "Prasar Bharati" (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Bill. Such rare incidences prove that in democracy if a mutual dialogue is called with a healthy mind on an issue of national interest, it does not constitute a problem—even for people with opposing viewpoints, rather it becomes an occasion for a meaningful solution.

Alas, if Vishwanath Pratap Singh had risen above sectarian, caste, and partisan politics to find a similar solution to the sensitive national reservation issue and taken the course of consultation with all parties concerned to reach a consensus, then the nation would not have come to the brink of the bitter caste war which is being seen now. Despite all the different views, the citizens' elected representatives were united in the opinion that the broadcasting media should be freed from governmental control. In the same way, in the matter of reservation, in spite of all the different political opinions, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha members have the one view that it is part of the national mandate to bring the oppressed lower caste people to the nation's forefront. It is also the moral and practical responsibility of all the segments of the society, especially the rich and the powerful, to make sure that they participate in any program aimed at bringing them also on an equal footing.

Vishwanath Pratap Singh has so confused the issue that the debate, straying from the real issues, is taking on all other impertinent dimensions where neither the good sense to understand the problem nor the intention to solve it seems to matter any more.

Even now, Vishwanath Pratap Singh is not handling this matter in a forthright manner. His official and non-official spokesmen are still talking about the three fixed and opportunistic opinions: (1) 27 percent reservation is above all discussions. This is not open for discussion as the country's "supreme leader" [i.e. V.P. Singh] has decided on this and he has never changed any of his decisions to date in his life (?) (2) The government and

the ruling party need not debate this as this was promised in the party's election manifesto and had to be implemented immediately. It is beside the point that the independence of the broadcasting media was also in the same election manifesto but still the necessity to discuss it within and outside the party openly was fully realized. (3) The question of five to 10 percent reservation based upon financial status may be discussed by all-party conferences if so desired, (because this may probably require a constitutional amendment and this minority government will not be able to do it without the cooperation of the other parties and the mercy of the Congress party).

The difficulty is that such important national problems cannot be solved by these small, clever maneuvers. This does not satisfy either "Mohan" [i.e. a person from the upper castes] nor benefit "Lallu" [i.e. a person from the lower castes], the imaginary characters of the late B. P. Mandal, because during the last two decades Mohan and Lallu have changed. The person who was Mohan until yesterday has become Lallu now and many Lallus have surpassed Mohans now. Without separating the real from the fake Lallus, it may be possible to cash in some political votes, but it is not possible to challenge down-to-earth realities based on whimsical myths.

Even in the late B. P. Mandal's own home state of Bihar, if one wants to see real "Mohans," they can see hundreds of villages of Mithila where the poverty of Brahmins is starkly visible, and if you wish to see the late Mandal's own caste people flexing their muscles, take a trip to Patna and Nalanda district where you will see the other face of the Lallus. One should not forget that the fast tides of change have in fact converted many "twice-borns" [i.e. upper castes] into "shudras" [i.e. lower castes] and transformed many downtrodden people into "Upper Castes." The need of this hour is that the real "Upper Caste" in both these categories of people should not benefit from those concessions reserved especially for the backward and low caste people only. It is necessary to assure that the "twice-born" people of either category do not profit from all of this. This must be assured.

There is an open discussion going on about several one-sided and partial recommendations of the B. P. Mandal Report. The chief of the technical committee of the Mandal Commission, Professor B. K. Roy Burman's eye-opening comments are a case in point. Furthermore, some of the so-called statistics which Mr. Mandal compiled in his lists in the case of Orissa, West Bengal, Gujarat, and several southern states have come out, and others will also come out.

The time has now come for V.P. Singh to decide whether like B.P. Mandal, he values more the temptation to adopt a lop-sided view due to political necessity or, he will realize the responsibility to take a healthy approach in keeping with the sentiments of the position bestowed upon him with enthusiasm by the citizens of this country representing all segments of its society.

The present state of inflation and lawlessness is unprecedented, and in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam problems as seen now have never existed before. In spite of his inability to solve such serious problems, the people have not yet become "disillusioned" with him. Whenever the Janata Dal Party members tried to attack him or members of his coalition disagreed with him, public opinion has always swayed in favor of V.P., and probably for this reason, back-stabbers within his own party have not flourished nor have the coalition parties stepped out of certain limits.

Instead of solving all these problems facing the nation, by bringing together all segments of the population of the country, if he is now bent upon dividing, deforming, and disintegrating the communal balance itself, then knowingly or unknowingly he will be leading the nation towards an unfortunate communal war. Should he not promptly and decisively rethink this new role he has chosen to play?

Foreign Office Spokesman Clarifies Stand on Kuwait

91AS0102A Madras THE HINDU in English
20 Sep 90 p 1

[Article: "India Denies Its Stand on Gulf Crisis is 'Muted'"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, 19 Sept. India today sought to clarify that it had expressed 'firm views' on the annexation of Kuwait, and had given 'unswerving, unequivocal' support to all the five Security Council resolutions in the wake of recent developments in the Gulf.

The clarification came from the Foreign office spokesman in response to questions on the reported displeasure in U.S. policy making circles over what is regarded as India's 'muted' condemnation of Iraq.

According to a Washington report, two leading Congressmen on the House Asia Sub-Committee, Mr Stephen Solarz and Mr Jim Leach, have told the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr Muchkund Dubey, that India's muted stand on Iraq could have a bearing on crucial decisions pertaining to Pakistan, as, in contrast with India, Pakistan would be seen in Washington as being a reliable friend, given that country's position on the Gulf developments.

The spokesman noted that India had abided strictly and punctiliously by all the Security Council resolutions and wondered how there could be 'any room for ambivalence or ambiguity' about its position on the Gulf.

The spokesman also recalled India's conviction that a peaceful settlement was the only way out of the present crisis. 'We believe the rest of the world would also wish to avoid violence', he noted. He said India would continue to work with the international community to find a peaceful solution 'which we believe is in the interest of humanity'.

Relief Fund Planned

UNI reports:

The Indian Government is considering setting up Gulf relief and rehabilitation fund for returning Indians. An official spokesman said the idea for a fund was thrown up at the Cabinet Sub-committee meeting yesterday to deal with the problems faced by Indians in the Gulf. The Finance Ministry would draw up a proposal in this regard.

He said the Government might seek the support of non-resident Indians (NRIs) and international help in constituting this fund.

Two Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft I1-76 would start operating shuttle services from tomorrow between Basra and Dubai to evacuate Indian nationals from Kuwait, the spokesman said.

Earlier it was planned to use the IAF aircraft between Baghdad and Bombay, but now the Indian Government has received permission to use the Basra airport which would be more convenient for the returning Indians.

Reportage on Evacuation of Indians From Gulf Region**Airlift Efforts Traced**

91AS0092A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 16 Sep 90 p 11

[Report by Srinivas Laxman, Tyrone D'Souza, Clarence Fernandez, Bishakha Datta and Madhavi Irani in Bombay, G.H. Jansen in Amman and Nicosia, Chidanand Rajghatta in Amman, Bombay and New Delhi, with additional inputs from The Times Research Bureau; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Mind-boggling: 150,000 people to be evacuated over a period of 60 days across 7,000 km. An operation involving 500 flights and more than 5,000 hours of flying time over a total of four million km—equal to circumlocuting the earth 150 times or making eight trips to the moon and back. At a cost that no one has yet dared to compute but which could range from anything between Rs [rupees] 300 crores and Rs 500 crores—the annual budget of a small Indian state.

An entry in the latest Guinness Book of World Records? Not yet. But one that will surely make it there as also into other assorted trivia scrapbooks soon.

Nothing like this has ever been attempted before. The great Indian airlift to evacuate its citizens from Kuwait has been compared to the Berlin airlift of 1948-49 to beat the blockade, but drawing parallels between the two seems far-fetched.

The Berlin airlift was not an evacuation. It essentially involved ferrying in supplies into the city over short distances; it lasted 11 months and cost the allies, at

current prices, about Rs one crore a day. It did not have much of a human dimension, something which constitutes the major factor in the Indian operation.

And what will the government get for undertaking this great feat? A panning, no doubt. For, at the end of it all, few of the 150,000 hapless evacuees will have a good word to say about the thankless operation. And fewer still will realise that they were part of the greatest civilian evacuation of all times.

The great Indian airlift saga is one that took its time to start, and was marred by shortsighted botches, confusion, uncertainty and rank bad organisation. For all of eight weeks, it careened crazily between disorder and chaos, till somehow, last week, it appeared to stabilise—but not before 50,000 evacuees were put through hell and fire so that another 100,000 could have a smoother passage.

It all began in the first week of August, when a group of 50 to 60 Indians embarked on a precarious drive out of Kuwait on the road to Amman soon after the Iraqi invasion on 2 August. On 10 August, the Indian Government asked Air India to operate a flight from Amman to airlift the stranded Haj pilgrims (there are no regular flights from Amman to Delhi or Bombay; the Royal Jordanian Airlines flies Amman-Delhi twice a week). Twelve hours later, the airline dispatched Rajendra Chola, its jumbo carrier, to bring back the first batch of 80 fleeing Indians along with the pilgrims. It was an innocent prelude to the massive operation, for the flood-gates were to be opened soon.

Ten days later, on 20 August, the external affairs minister, Mr I.K. Gujral, made his way to Kuwait via Baghdad, becoming the first foreign dignitary to visit the invaded oildom. From all accounts (see box), Mr Gujral's utterances in Kuwait, along with the precipitate move to close down the Indian embassy there, sparked off the exodus. Soon after Mr Gujral left Kuwait, carrying with him about 200 Indians on a controversial IAF [Indian Air Force] flight, all hell broke loose. Hundreds of Indians, who heard of the sneaky flight of wealthy Indians, began packing up and streaming towards Baghdad. Says Bikramjit Singh, an Indian student holidaying in Kuwait with his parents: "It sparked off a panic. The rumour went around that many people had fled on the flight carrying all their money and gold." Adds Vishal Nanda, another student: "Brothers betrayed brothers to get on that flight." The notorious flight came to be dubbed a "millionaires' flight carrying millionaires carrying millions."

When the first flood of expatriates streamed into the Indian embassy in Baghdad around 22 August, the mission was caught totally unawares. There were no flights operating in or out of Baghdad at that time, and, in fact, the mission itself was totally cut off from New Delhi and the Indian embassy in neighbouring Jordan. Of the five-member embassy staff, two—first secretary Arun Goel and section officer V.K. Srivastava—were in

India on leave. At the best of times, Indian missions abroad are known to represent the prime characteristics of Indian officialdom: sloth and inefficiency. With no warning, guidance or resources, the Baghdad mission simply directed the Indian nationals to Amman.

The Amman mission, with an even thinner staff, was no better. In the beginning, when the expatriates sailed through the Al-Ruweished border in hundreds, the mission managed somehow, packing about 600 expatriates home on board the two special flights that began operating. But when the hundreds turned to thousands, the Indian ambassador, Mr Gajendra Singh, a quiet, retiring man who stirred up the foreign service some years ago by seeking to marry a Romanian woman while posted in Bucharest (he was not given permission) threw up his hands in despair.

It took the government a full fortnight to digest the seriousness of the situation and take steps to remedy it. Between 20 August and 5 September, the lumbering government reinforced the Army embassy with additional personnel, sent a team of officers from the National Informatics Centre to streamline evacuation procedures, posted several Air India personnel to handle everything from ticketing to flight maintenance and operation, and gradually increased the flights from two to ten a day. Though it was a case of better late than never, the delay had already sent things spinning out of control. The huge influx meant a backlog in Amman, which in turn meant the Jordanians holding up entry at the border, both of which added up to the now famous hellhole in no man's land called Shalaan.

The government has its explanations for being unable to handle the crisis at the initial stage: there were not enough flights available; it had trouble securing over-flight clearance with several countries particularly in using the military transport aircraft; the Iraqis played hard to get, initially agreeing to an airlift from Baghdad and Basra, but later demanding that the Indian planes bring in food—a smart way to bust the embargo by virtually holding Indian evacuees as hostages. At the same time, the government was also straitjacketed by the U.S.-led sanctions, which meant not being able to meet Iraqi conditions and not even being able to lease the idle Iraqi Airways planes for evacuation. As the government struggled to extricate itself from this cleft, the refugee problem in Jordan precipitated and tempers ran high.

While all these problems had some basis, the truth is also that the government simply failed to anticipate the extent of the exodus and the apparatus needed to tackle it.

For the first 40,000 evacuees, it was hell on earth. Thousands suffered the horror of the Shalaan camp in no man's land, described by many as worse than a ghetto. Many had to undergo a week's internment here before journeying to Amman and a further week-long wait before boarding a flight home.

The government woke up fully to the crisis only last week, after sustained reports of the callous treatment meted out of the evacuees in Baghdad and Amman. In a step that should have been taken much earlier, the cabinet cleared the use of the Airbus-320 planes, 14 of which had been lying idle owing to their grounding for the past seven months. Being a short-distance aircraft, the A-320's were used to carry passengers from Amman to Dubayy, who were carted from there by plane or ship to Bombay. At the same time, it also increased the frequency of the Air India flights. The giant military transport aircraft, IL-76 (also called Gajraj) with a capacity of 400, was pressed into service. Air India, meanwhile, secured an Aeroflot IL-62 on wet lease. Significantly, it was the first time that all three wings of Indian aviation—Air India, Indian Airlines and the Indian Air Force—were involved in an operation.

The external affairs ministry even prodded the surface transport ministry to send a Shipping Corporation carrier, Tipu Sultan, to undertake a 1,000 nautical mile voyage to Dubayy to ferry over 500 Indians. Finally, someone was knocking the operation into shape.

By the middle of last week, there were nearly ten sorties for Indians from the Gulf each day on two different routes—Amman-Bombay and Dubayy-Bombay—with an Amman-Dubayy link-up. From a mere 350 evacuees a day, the number was now up to 3,500 a day with the Gulf airbridge being covered almost every hour. By 14 September, the government had operated more than 100 flights from the Gulf and West Asia, airlifting about 40,000 evacuees.

After nearly a month of bedlam arising out of the sheer unexpectedness of the situation, some order was returning to the evacuation process last week. For one, the rapid pulling out of Indian nationals from Amman not only meant that the backlog in the refugee-clogged city was cleared, but it also meant the Jordanians allowing more evacuees from no man's land to enter Al-Ruweished. At the same time, the Jordanians also agreed to shift all Indians from the Shalaan camp to another better organised camp in Asraq, a small town 100 km inland from the border.

The Jordanian authorities too went out of their way to allow Indian flights into Amman's Queen Alia airport which is equipped to handle only 20 flights a day but is currently taking in more than 50. Within Alia, Jordanian airline officials cheerfully gave up their own office space to allow the hard-pressed Indian Airlines staff—beefed up with additional personnel from Bombay—to work, while the administration waived the airport tax and all customs and immigration formalities for the evacuees. In Bombay, a control cell was formed at Air India's Nariman Point headquarters to function round the clock and monitor the evacuation process.

But the delay and the unhurried manner in which the whole operation took off left a bitter taste in the mouth

of many Indian nationals. Few among the 40,000 evacuated in the first five weeks had anything good to say about the admittedly herculean effort. Usually, the embassies took the rap for the government's initial disinclination. Like any representative government office, the embassies, too, had two kinds of people; the selfless conscientious diplomat who worked 18 hours a day, and the typical babu-types who continued to work a mere six hours a day and behaved as if nothing had happened. Thus it came to be that the same set of officials were appreciated and damned by different sets of people.

For Indian officialdom, the massive operation brought with it its quota of miseries. Services on the two airliners, Air India and Indian Airlines, were thrown totally out of gear. The airlift came right in the middle of the peak season for Air India, when there is a rush for U.S. and European destinations and its flights are usually full. With five of its 20 aircraft being set aside for the airlift, it had to knock off several regular flights. Its poor cousin, Indian Airlines, was even more hamstrung with 30 percent of its Airbus fleet being diverted to the airlift, till the decision to reinduct the A-320's gave it some breathing space.

The operations also meant massive expense for Air India, which was heading the effort. Air India officials last week totted up a tentative bill of Rs 200 crores for the effort, a projection that may go up, considering the rise in aviation fuel prices and insurance costs due to the Gulf imbroglio. The Airlines also faced the problem of several pilots reporting sick, and even the stewardesses were reluctant to work on this special sector. Says an Air India official posted in Amman for the emergency operation, "No one will ever give us our due, even after things have been streamlined, everyone will remember the hellish first days."

The evacuation efforts were not without lacunae. In Kuwait, Amman, Baghdad and even Bombay, complaints about favouritism, parochialism and plain bungling were frequent. Not till the evacuees boarded the special flights at Queen Alia did the bitter outpourings and complaining stop. Once on board and in flight, the evacuees settled down to the sumptuous meal the airlines had laid out for them—an oversized tray consisting of a choice of chicken or mutton, fruits, kheer and even a bar of milk chocolate. Said one air-hostess, "These are the strangest flights I have flown. Everyone is deadly quiet and reflective."

At Bombay's Sahar airport, each day resembled a jam-boree as the trickle of evacuees turned into a regular flood of 3,500 a day. Several state governments, including those of Kerala, Goa, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, set up special counters to look after their state subjects. Some like West Bengal and Rajasthan did not care. The railways pulled out all stops and provided all evacuees with passes to their destination. The Kerala government ran four shuttle buses from the airport to the Bombay Central station where a special night train to

Trivandrum was available. Each day, 600 Keralites used the facility. The Karnataka government offered free passage on its state transport corporation buses to anywhere in the state. More than 80 percent of the evacuees are from the southern states and most south-bound trains had special coaches. A Central Railway spokesman said they had so far provided 20,000 free passes for Gulf returnees.

But the complaints never stopped. Several evacuees were miffed that the government had reduced the assistance dole to Rs 100 from Rs 1000, the amount given when the operations had started. Some state governments promptly began handing out Rs 500 each to the evacuees. The poorer expatriates were bewildered by the plethora of forms they had to fill. Most were angry about the bond they had to sign to repay the Rs 9,032 spent on their repatriation. Said Ramprasad Dhobi from Uttar Pradesh, who worked as a washerman in Kuwait: "I would like to return to Kuwait. But the government has stamped my passport. They won't let me return unless I pay the money, and I have no means." The well-heeled expatriates, who could afford to buy their fare back home, but had to go through the repatriation process because of the shortage of regular flights, were riled that they could not resume their overseas peregrinations because their passports had been stamped.

But facilitating their return abroad was the last thing on the government's mind last week as it struggled to streamline the evacuation process. By Saturday, the airlift was less than halfway through—about 90 flights having cleared 36,000 evacuees—and no one was yet saying thank you to the government.

[Boxed item]

Homecoming Blues

For the 45,000 evacuees who have fled Kuwait so far since the first week of August, the route to relief was paved with heat and hunger, dust and destitution. History's largest long-distance exodus took different roads and modes, and involved painful and pitiless journeys lasting a week or sometimes more. Some hated it, others suffered it, but no one claimed to enjoy it. It was an experience no one would care to undergo again.

The standard route that most evacuees took began in Kuwait with a drive first to Basra and then onward to Baghdad. From either or both places, the hapless expatriates were hustled out by the Indian consular and embassy officials, who apparently indicated that they were helpless and that relief and succour lay in Amman. Continuing their road journey towards Amman, the expatriates (particularly those who fled after 20 August) were stopped by the Jordanian authorities in no man's land, a 70-km-long corridor between Iraq and Jordan, short of the Al-Ruweished checkpoint.

An internment lasting anything from two to seven days at the camp followed, after which the road journey to Amman continued. There was a further two to five-day

wait in Amman, before they were flown out by special flights to Bombay. For most, there remained a further last leg or two of the journey, onward by train to the nearest big town and then by bus or train to their homes and collapse. At the end of it all, many had logged upwards of 7000 km of hellish travelling.

There were exceptions—some tougher, some easier—to this standard exodus route. The luckiest were those who were well-heeled. This minority drove to Baghdad, caught an Iraqi Airways flight to Amman, went through as transit passengers and took a regular Royal Jordanian flight to Delhi or were accommodated on an Air India special flight to Bombay. This elite group did not face the ravages of the desert in no man's land, or the chaos and confusion of Amman.

Then there were groups which drove into Baghdad, heard of the horrors in no man's land and the crush in Amman, and tried to make their way into Iran or Turkey, were turned away, and staggered back through the same route, even more tired and defeated.

Two groups took the sea route, one sailing straight out of the Shuwaikh port in Kuwait on board the Panamanian cargo ship, 'Safer.' Another group was flown to Dubayy and brought home by 'Tipu Sultan.'

Lately, about 1000 evacuees each day are being flown from Amman to Dubayy and airlifted from there in order to make optimum use of the short haul Airbus-320's which cannot fly Amman-Bombay direct.

Manama Mission's Troubles

91AS0092B Madras *THE HINDU* in English
17 Sep 90 p 9

[Article by F.J. Khergamvala]

[Text] Manama (Bahrain), 16 Sep—Until three days back the Indian ambassador in Baghdad had no phone nor telex. He is organising a daily convoy of 50 buses from Kuwait to Amman, hiring Iraqi planes for charters, running a courier service to Basra and has to confront the twists of the Iraqi regime. Yet Mr Eduardo Faleiro Congress(I) MP [Member of Paaliament] lands up in Baghdad demanding a vehicle and an escort for Kuwait.

He was given a car. When the embassy pleaded paucity of staff the politician called up journalists to complain that the Indian ambassador is the most inefficient officer he had seen and said he will ensure his recall and replacement. Other embassies in the region engaged in the evacuee operations are full of complaints of the shenanigans of these visiting politicians. Their message is "keep them home." Isn't there any other route from New Delhi to Harare other than Dubayy for parliamentarians?

The Indian embassy was completely cut off from the outside when, according to Iraqi officials there was a fire in the exchange. "That is what they say," commented an Indian official in Baghdad. Mr Kamal Bakhshi, the

Indian Ambassador, has had some strong words to say to the Iraqi Government, blaming it in strong language for discriminatory treatment in not making available planes for charter. Now after a little riot at the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad, that mission is not entertaining visa applications from individuals. This means that one officer must wait there all day until applications are done. In the midst of all these and similar problems in Amman, politicians like Mr Churchill Alemao from Goa had been taking away passports of selected evacuees to get them priority treatment.

Mr Bakhshi was very cautious in responding to questions about the difficulties in his way by Indian politicians. "All I can say is I am trying to please everybody but under such circumstances we apologise to those who have been inconvenienced. My focus must remain on evacuation and proper organisation."

Complex Undertaking

The Iraqi Government is trying to help in the evacuation by convoy. Perhaps late on Sunday night a convoy of over 2,000 people might reach outside Jordan. The Iraqi officials have refused permission for the vehicles to enter Jordan. Hence some kind of intermediate transit must be established. This is a very complex undertaking because after teething problems in the earlier convoys, this is now expected to become the regular route for the exodus of the 120,000 Indians who wish to leave Kuwait. The Jordanians are allowing only 200 visas a day for Indians. Meanwhile 2,000 Hajis turn up saying they too are stuck in Iraq and need priority because they are not victims as the Indians in Kuwait are.

Asked to outline the other measures being explored to get the Indians out, Mr Bakhshi explained "We are working on everything, perhaps a ship shuttle from Kuwait to Dubayy, air charters, Indian Air Force flights from Basra, everything." Though he declined to reveal details, it is understood that the Saudis had not permitted overflights for Iraqi charters perhaps because of about 70 planes landing in the Eastern Province every day with troops and supplies. But these difficulties did not come in the way of giving overflight permission to planes carrying western evacuees.

Arrest of Indians

The arrest by Iraqi officials of some Indians from Kuwait for possessing fake dollars required deployment of an already understaffed mission to get their release. Hundreds of Indians have no passports, either lost, left behind or just plain missing, because their employers had vanished. Neither Jordan nor Iraq will allow formalities to be done without travel papers. Several people have no money at all.

In the midst of all this come politicians asking for cars and escorts. They have used the occasion to give campaign speeches in the hope that agency correspondents will carry back tales of party loyalty to bosses in India.

Despite all these hurdles, it has been possible to send 50,000 Indians to Amman after encamping them in Baghdad.

Discrimination

It is not only the ruling party that needs to see this thing through without further glitches. Other parties would do well to avoid situations where the acting head of state in Jordan feels it necessary to call in the Indian ambassador and tell him about the favouritism based on parochial considerations. Notwithstanding official denials such a practice is a fact. Perhaps a stint with the Iraqi President, Mr Saddam Husayn, will discipline those who manage to complete the course.

AFP reports from Baghdad

Governor Named

Iraq has named its Minister of Local Government, Mr Ali Hassan al-Majid, as Governor of Kuwait, officials said in Baghdad on Sunday.

Mr Majid, senior official of the ruling Baath party, will continue to hold his Cabinet post, they said.

Rich, Poor Refugees

91AS0092C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 14 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Bishakha Datta]

[Text] Bombay, 13 Sep—Being a refugee does not always, as is commonly supposed, iron out the great divide between rich and poor. Ask Sunil Oberoi. The 29-year-old civil engineer from New Delhi who had spent the last 13 years in Kuwait flew back on a special Air India plane from Amman to Bombay earlier this week. Being a refugee was "no problem, yaar," explains Mr Oberoi, in the casual tone of a matador who has effortlessly finished off the prize bull.

Maybe that's because the Oberois still had wealth after the Iraqis marched into Kuwait. After selling off some electronic goods at cut-rate prices, a dozen members of the Oberoi family pushed off from Kuwait. "We all had our own cars, there was no problem." In Baghdad, the family settled into the Dar-Es-Salaam Hotel. "It's a four-star hotel," Mr Oberoi stresses, as his gold LOVE pendant struggles to find a home on his hairy chest. "We moved in and out of Baghdad. We even went back to Kuwait to take care of some business." A week later, the family paid a princely \$159 per head for an overpriced airticket to Amman airport, where they joined the serpentine queue of unwashed refugees waiting for Air India flight 8940.

At the airport too, money coated the refugee experience with a sugar lining for the Oberois. "I telephoned my wife in Delhi," he says. "I called my sister in Sweden. We even called our brother in the States."

If Mr Oberoi's experience straddles one end of the Great Refugee Divide, Mohammed Hussain Jatam's straddles the other. Mr Jatam, a 51-year-old from Raigad district in Maharashtra, set off on what has in the last few days become the standard Kuwait-Baghdad refugee route in a minibus rented at 100 dinars per person. By 6 September, Jatam had been dumped at a hastily-assembled refugee camp on the Iraq-Jordan border, where he queued up with 7,000 others for a portion of Arabian bread called khabbus, a bit of cheese, and a tomato thrice a day. Jatam bided his five days at the desert camp hatching schemes to get past the campguards. His destination: the Indian embassy in Amman, where his passport would be stamped with a five-digit number and the harsh words that signified his inability to pay Rs [rupees] 9,032 for air passage back to Bombay. "No further passport service to be rendered without reference to the ministry of external affairs (consular section) New Delhi.

If Jatam made it back to India, it is largely because of resources other than money. "Chori Chhupi raste se main Amman gaya," he mumbles through two missing front teeth. A hurried rendezvous with Indian embassy officials, a transfer to the Amman International Fairgrounds where he slept out in the open, a 24-hour wait in an airport queue followed. "No one's for anyone else out there," sighs Mr Jatam, sadly.

Mr Jatam and Mr Oberoi are just two of the 33,500 refugees that India's airlines have flown into Bombay in the last 10 days. In between are many others, some whose wealth has permitted them to reach Amman airport in four days, where they can afford to munch hamburgers, cheese sandwiches, and crinkle their noses at the camp refugees. The camp refugees' lot is different: to queue for hours without food, water or any material comfort. Almost a dozen flights—carrying 3,000 passengers—touch down at Sahar airport each day, converting the Air India arrival terminal into a whirlwind of government workers, official forms, bewildered passengers and eager social workers.

Although the airline authorities have simplified the elephantine immigration, baggage and customs clearance procedures for the refugees, passengers are still welcomed with a slew of paperwork. Each refugee is required to register at a special ministry of external affairs desk where eight employees work round the clock, offering a loan of Rs [rupees] 100 to each passenger. Almost 23,900 passengers have availed of the loan, an MEA [Middle East Airlines] official explained. Ministry spokespersons could not, however, explain why the loan amount had suddenly been brought down from Rs 1,000 to Rs 100.

The Indian railways, and the Gujarat, Maharashtra, Kerala and Karnataka governments have also put up assistance booths in the immigration hall. Although the Goa, Assam, and Tamil Nadu governments had advertised their presence through posters, there were no representatives around.

While the railways offer free rail transport anywhere in the country, the Gujarat booth, below a prominent poster saying "We welcome you at Gujarat," offers each Gujarati refugee Rs 500. About 1,000 refugees have taken the money since the booth was set up on 30 August. Next door, the Karnataka government offers refugees free transport to the Bombay Central train station, and free bus passage on Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation buses anywhere in the state. The Kerala government offers similar services to Keralites; four special buses ferry Keralites to Bombay Central station where a special night train is available. Almost 600 Keralites use this facility each day, a spokesperson said.

The Maharashtra government seemed to have one of the most comprehensive assistance programmes going. Assistance of Rs 500 is given to each returning family. "We haven't decided whether this is recoverable or not," an employee said. In addition, free BEST [expansion unknown] bus transport is provided to all refugees, free state transport services to Maharashtrians, 24-hour shelter is available but has never been availed of, and the state assists school students in getting admission anywhere within the state. About 62 students have been educationally assisted to date and 1,705 people have availed of cash assistance.

If the state governments have excelled in providing at least some facilities for those returning, they have fallen flat on details.

Iraq's Broken Promises

91AS0092D Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 14 Sep 90 p 11

[Text] New Delhi, 13 Sep—India has sent a telegram to Iraq complaining that it has gone back on three important commitments, to the detriment of the Indians stranded in Kuwait and Iraq.

The first of these Iraqi commitments was that Indian aircraft would be allowed to fly to Kuwait to pick up Indians living there. The second was that Indians in Kuwait would be allowed to go to the ports of Basra and Um Kasr, from where they would be allowed to board Indian ships and go home.

Thirdly, the staff of the Indian embassy in Kuwait, who had agreed to move temporarily to Basra, were to be allowed to travel freely to Kuwait to assist Indian citizens there.

According to official sources, Iraq has gone back on all three commitments. It has not yet replied to the Indian complaint.

Iraq has also made it clear that if India wants to send food to stranded Indians, then Iraq will appropriate part of this food for its own citizens. In short, any despatch of humanitarian food will be converted into a violation of the UN trade sanctions.

This confirms the fears expressed by members of the security council that the proposed shipload of food and medicines India wishes to send will be diverted in part to the Iraqis.

Meanwhile, Iraq is refusing to provide food to Indians and other Asians, even though European and American citizens are being kept and fed in the best hotels. This discrimination has dismayed Indian officials.

All Indian contractors working on construction projects in Iraq (employing around 20,000 persons) were told in late August that they would no longer get official rations and would have to fend for themselves. Then in early September, Mr Saddam Husayn called the ambassadors of six Asian countries, including India, and told them that no food would be available for their citizens.

This is seen by some Indian officials as using Asians as virtual hostages in order to force the world to send food to Iraq. The lack of cooperation in helping speed up the evacuation of stranded Indians seems to be further evidence of Iraq trying to make political capital out of human misery.

Even water has become a scarce commodity in Kuwait since chemicals for operating its desalination plants are no longer available. Some Indians could die of starvation or thirst if they are not evacuated speedily.

Initially, some officials feared that harsh words might jeopardise the fate of Indians stranded in the Gulf. Because of these fears, India took three days to react formally to Iraq's invasion and, even then, expressed regret rather than outright condemnation.

Mr I.K. Gujral, the external affairs minister, visited Baghdad before going to Kuwait and was shown on TV screens across the world hugging Mr Saddam Husayn.

This may have been done to ensure the safety of Indians, but has created an impression abroad that India is soft on Iraq.

The Prime Minister's office is unhappy about this and is anxious to emphasise that it does not in any way condone the invasion and supports the UN sanctions, despite the considerable economic cost to India. Now that Iraq has shown so little concern for stranded Indian citizens, the ministry of external affairs is showing a new willingness to call a spade a spade. This is exemplified by its telegram complaining that Iraq has failed to stand by its commitments.

One unfortunate consequence of having appeared soft on Iraq earlier is that India may lose out in its attempt to get compensation for economic damage caused by the sanctions. Article 50 of the UN charter provides for compensation to parties affected by sanctions. Several billion dollars have already been pledged by donors such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan and the European Community, and the total could approach \$15 billion.

Countries that have sought compensation include Jordan, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and India. However, oil import prices could cost India anything from \$1 billion to \$3 billion a year. The crisis will mean the drying up of remittances from workers in Iraq and Kuwait (estimated at Rs [rupees] 800 crores per year).

It will also mean the end of civil contracts (fetching Rs 200 crores a year) and thousands of crores worth of exports.

Finally, the cost of relief and transportation for the stranded Indian could add Rs 500 crores. India faces a very heavy economic burden and badly needs compensation. If it gets little or no compensation on the ground of its supposed softness towards Iraq, Indians will have suffered the worst of both worlds—humiliation and starvation at the hand of Mr Saddam Husayn and deliberate neglect on the part of the donors of compensation.

Efforts Scaled Down

91AS0092E Madras *THE HINDU* in English
18 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, 17 Sep—India today indicated that the imposing effort mounted in the last ten days to evacuate its nationals trapped in the Gulf was being scaled down, since most of the people wanting to leave Kuwait had already done so.

Briefing presspersons, the spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry said about 55,000 Indians entered Jordan since 2 August. Of these, 47,500 had been airlifted. The remaining were expected to be taken out in the next three days.

It is difficult to say if India would take any noticeable political position on the entire range of Gulf developments once what the spokesman described as the "biggest evacuation exercise undertaken by any country or international organisation" is completed in all material respects.

Responding to queries, the spokesman said India had not taken any position on the air blockade of Iraq mooted by the United States and its allies, in addition to the UN-sanctioned maritime blockade now in force. Because such a suggestion had not taken effect, it was difficult for the Government to comment on it, he said.

The spokesman refused to comment on the U.S. decision to sell weapons worth over \$20 billion to Saudi Arabia. He had nothing to say when asked if this held any implications for India.

The Government has also chosen not to comment on the high profile interview to the *WASHINGTON POST* by the Chief of the U.S. Air Force who revealed to the paper the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use America air power to bombard everything in Baghdad except objects of religious or cultural value in the event of war, and to target specifically the Iraqi President, Mr Saddam

Husayn, just as Colonel al-Qadhafi of Libya had been targetted during the bombing of Tripoli.

Exports To Gulf Area Reported At a Standstill

91AS0094A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 14 Sep 90 p 15

[Text] Kochi, 13 Sep (PTI)—Since the Gulf crisis began over a month ago, export of Indian merchandise like spices, tea, coffee, textiles and meat to the region have come to a standstill.

If the stalemate continues without being sorted out, it will adversely affect India's balance of payments position.

At a time when the country was going all out to boost exports to check the widening gap between imports and exports, India stands to lose crores of rupees [Rs] worth of foreign exchange by the cessation of exports to the oil-rich countries.

Cochin port alone accounts for despatch of seven to eight containers a week by ship to various Gulf ports like Bahrain, Dubayy and Muscat, besides Kuwait.

Value of goods comes to approximately Rs 25 to 30 lakh, shipping sources told PTI.

The containers can not be despatched now to any of the Gulf ports as all available space is "choked" with baggages of Kuwaiti repatriates to India and other countries.

Moreover, the Gulf waters are under the control of the U.S. Navy which makes it difficult for Merchant Navy ships to get berthing facilities at any of the Gulf ports.

Already 14 containers, shipped by various shipping companies in Kochi prior to the Gulf crisis, have to be unloaded at Dubayy.

These containers, filled with coffee, textiles, spices, and buffalo meat, valued at several lakhs of rupees and bound for Kuwait, could not be sent.

Shippers are making efforts to find buyers for these goods in other Gulf countries—Reserve Bank clearance has been sought to issue fresh letters of credit for the new buyers in the Gulf for the goods.

Meanwhile, port authorities at Dubayy are being requested to waive dummerage [as published] charges, which might come to a good sum, for the unloaded cargo lying in Dubayy port for the last five weeks or so.

Enquiries made with the office of the protector of emigrants here showed that as the Gulf crisis continued unresolved there was shortage of food and the resultant high prices in some Gulf countries.

Keralites are still seeking emigration clearance to United Arab Emirates (UAE). Dubayy, Bahrain, though the number of clearance seekers have come down by 50 percent from 25 per day to 12 or 13 per day now.

The Government of India recently lifted the ban on issuance of clearance for Saudi Arabia, but hardly one or two people seek clearance from the protector of emigrants to go to Saudi Arabia.

Report That U.S. Interdicted Indian Ship Denied

91AS0101A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
12 Sep 90 p 9

[Article: "Interdiction of Ship: India's Denial"]

[Text] New Delhi, 11 Sept. India today denied a Dubai report that the U.S. Navy had interdicted its ship, M.V. [Merchant Vessel] Tipu Sultan, carrying food and medicines and prevented it from going to Kuwait.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said the ship had set sail for Kuwait on September 1 to ferry Indian expatriates to Dubai.

While on the high seas, the ship received instructions (from Iraq) that it would be allowed to dock only if it carried food. The vessel left for Port Khor Fakkan in Oman, the spokesman said.

It did not go to Kuwait and picked up 539 Indian nationals from Dubai. It was expected to reach India in a day or two, he said and described as "highly inaccurate" the report that the U.S. Navy had prevented the Indian vessel from going to Kuwait.

The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi is unaware of any attempt by the U.S. Navy to intercept or block M.V. Tipu Sultan on its journey to Kuwait, an Embassy statement said.

If the ship has been denied access to Kuwait, it was a result of the Iraqi Government's previously-stated refusal to allow foreign rescue vessels to dock there without having food and medicines on board, the statement said.

High ranking Indian diplomatic sources in the Gulf have also denied that M.V. Tipu Sultan was stopped in the gulf by the U.S. Navy.

"It was never stopped or challenged or even a radio contact made with it by any of the naval force present in the gulf to enforce the United Nations sanctions against Iraq."

They said the ship was instructed to go to Dubai when the Government could not get a waiver from the UN for it to go to Kuwait. The ship was carrying foodstuff meant for its would-be passengers from Kuwait.

Correspondent Reports Dubey's Visit to Washington

91AS0097A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
22 Sep 90 p 6

[Article by R. Chakrapani: "Indo-US Ties Not Under Strain: Dubey"]

[Text] Washington, 21 Sept. The Foreign Secretary Mr Muchkund Dubey, who today completed a full round of

discussions with the Bush administration and leading lights in the U.S. Congress, said the impression he gained from his contacts was that the U.S. was "predominantly preoccupied" with the Gulf crisis. "They have made support for their Gulf policy virtually the test of friendship with other countries."

"They have put a lot of stake in the Gulf policy and indicated they would like to take the international community with them in the various stages of dealing with the crisis."

He said "the Gulf crisis has not come in the way of development of our relations. Whatever differences in nuances, my visit has definitely served the purpose of removing these differences and has furthered our bilateral relations."

Mr Dubey met the U.S. Secretary of State Mr James Baker, his deputy, Mr Lawrence Eagleburger, Mr Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser at the White House, Mr Richard Kimmit, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and senior officials.

On Capitol Hill, he talked to senators Mr Daniel P. Moynihan, Mr Alan Cranston, Mr Paul Sarbanes, Mr Dave Durenberger, Mr Paul Simon, Mrs Nancy Kassenbaum and congressmen Mr Stephen J. Solarz, Mr Mervyn Dymally and Mr Jim Leach.

Mr Dubey said his visit was one of those held between officials of the two countries periodically. Despite their preoccupation with the Gulf problem, he went through the agenda of bilateral questions like trade and transfer of technology.

He said he presented India's problems arising from the Gulf developments to those with whom he had talks. He told them that higher oil prices had added \$1.5 billion to India's import Bill. This was a conservative estimate on the assumption that the oil prices would not go beyond \$24 a barrel.

India had lost an export income of \$500 millions as a result of the crisis. About \$400 millions was from Kuwait, now under Iraqi occupation. India also would be spending about \$1 billion on transportation costs to bring Indian nationals from the region.

"I presented the case but I did not ask for aid" he clarified. "I have not come here with a begging bowl. If India has met other crises of this nature in the past, it can meet this also."

He thought the prospects of aid from the U.S., U.K. and France were difficult. The U.S. has persuaded some of the other affluent nations like Japan to make assistance, near and long term, available to frontline States in the crisis like Egypt and Turkey. This could be extended to other countries severely affected like India.

He said the European Community was about to make a decision on providing \$2 billions in aid. The Indian Ambassador at Brussels had been asked to remain in touch with the Community.

While India was waiting to be heard by the Security Council's Sanctions Committee and was sixth in line to present its case, it was his feeling some effort could be made in the World Bank and the IMF to provide assistance to countries like India.

Referring to India's relief effort in Kuwait and Iraq, he said no other country had done as much as India had done to go to the rescue of its nationals caught up in the crisis.

Technology transfer: Mr Dubey said technology transfer was covered in his talks but he gained the impression that because of the feeling in U.S. that its trust in Iraq had been misplaced and that Iraq had gone ahead with the production of chemical weapons, countries like India would come under pressure of U.S. non-proliferation regime in technology transfer.

Mr Dubey apparently had also discussed the U.S. moves to create a new order for European security and a regional security structure in the Gulf to deal with Iraqi types of situations.

India's gut feeling is that keeping foreign forces in the region might not be advisable because, in course of time, the powers keeping such forces could become unpopular locally. Likewise, induction of arms in the region was not the best way to deal with Iraqi military might. There was also the danger that these arms might find their way elsewhere, in South Asia especially, and create problems.

As regards Europe, the NATO may not be the best fitted one in a post coldwar setting. There has to be new institutions, multilateral in concept, to deal with the problems of the 20th Century and the next.

Analyst Assesses Indo-Afghan Talks Result

91AS0103A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
1 Sep 90 p 10

[Article by K. K. Katyal: "Indo-Afghan Talks Reflect Similarity of Views"]

[Text] New Delhi, 31 Aug. A joint statement issued today at the end of the Afghan President, Dr. Najibullah's visit to India reflected a synchronised approach to matters of concern to the two countries—to threat of subversion in the case of India, and external interference and violation of the Geneva Accords in the case of Afghanistan.

It gave a gist of his discussions with the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, on bilateral, regional and global issues, which were marked by mutual understanding and similarity of views. They expressed satisfaction over the trends of bilateral relations.

Though not specified, it was obviously in the context of Pakistan's role in instigating trouble in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, that the two leaders reiterated the "imperative necessity for all States to observe the principles of coexistence and to eschew sustenance and support to secessionist and terrorist activities".

It was an essential prerequisite for regional peace and stability, according to them, that the concerned countries observed fundamental and accepted norms for inter-State dealings—non-interference in internal affairs and avoidance of acts subverting the unity and integrity of other States—as enshrined in the UN Charter and the NAM [Nonaligned Movement] principles.

While considering the regional implications of the conflict in Afghanistan, the two leaders stressed the importance of a negotiated political settlement—in consonance with the emerging trends the world over. A continuance of the conflict and efforts to resolve it militarily were seen as fraught with adverse implications for regional stability. They called for immediate and full implementation of the Geneva Accord and for the end of all external interference in the affairs of Afghanistan.

P.M.'s satisfaction: The Prime Minister, the joint statement said, expressed satisfaction over the national reconciliation policy, as detailed by Dr. Najibullah, and reiterated the Indian position that a negotiated political settlement, based on existing realities and legitimate interests of all, was the only viable solution for the Afghan question. Mr Singh drew Dr. Najibullah's attention to the wide consensus in India, in support of this approach, as shown by the resolution adopted by Parliament on August 24.

Mr Singh expressed the hope that Afghanistan would soon take its rightful place in the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation]. India, as was known, had worked for Afghanistan's admission in the South Asian grouping but the move was thwarted by Pakistan.

As regards India's commitment to give all possible humanitarian help to Afghanistan, the statement mentioned the supply of 1300 tonnes of wheat seed, agreement on the supply of 50,000 tonnes of wheat on credit, and the decision to give buses to Afghanistan in return for goods from there.

During Dr. Najibullah's visit, three documents were signed—one on the cultural exchange programme, a second was a memorandum of understanding for cooperation between agricultural institutions and the third was an agreement on prevention and trafficking of narcotic drugs.

Najib Meets Rajiv for an Hour

PTI reports:

Dr. Najibullah today had an hour-long meeting with the Congress(I) president, Mr Rajiv Gandhi. They discussed

the developments in the region, including the Gulf crisis. The discussions took place when the Afghan President and his wife, visited Mr Gandhi at his residence for morning coffee, Mr K. Natwar Singh, convener of the AICC(I) [All India Congress Committee-I] foreign affairs department, said.

Mr Gandhi had had a 45 minute meeting with Dr. Najibullah when he called on the visiting dignitary at the Rashtrapati Bhavan yesterday.

Papers Report on Developments in Bharatiya Janata Party

Advani 14 Sep Speech

91AS0100A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 15 Sep 90 p 1

[Article: "Don't Take Us for Granted: Advani"]

[Text] Bhopal, Sept. 14. The BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] president, Mr L.K. Advani, today warned the V.P. Singh government against taking the party's support for granted.

"We sincerely want that this government should last its full term but it would be a monumental folly on their part if they presume that they can take our support for granted for all times to come," he said while inaugurating a three-day study camp of BJP MPs [Members of Parliament] and MLAs [Members of Legislative Assembly] here.

Giving vent to his disenchantment with rare candour, Mr Advani criticised the manner in which the Prime Minister had taken an unilateral decision on the Mandal commission report and also announced that the minorities commission would get constitutional status. "We shall not allow this amendment to take place and no constitutional amendment can be made without our support," he said.

Mr Advani described the nine-month rule of the National Front [NF] government as dismal. "This government has failed on the four major issues on which it was elected—Kashmir, Punjab, Bofors and prices—and these are issues on which there are no differences," he said.

Referring to the disillusionment of the people, Mr Advani said the National Front came to power on the strength of the people's vote against the misrule of the Congress but their expectations were not fulfilled. "The disenchantment with Mr Rajiv Gandhi came in two-and-a-half years, but in the case of this government, it has come much faster."

The BJP president minced no words while speaking on the Mandal commission issue. "This government, which consults the Marxists and us on small issues like which minister should be dropped from the cabinet, did not consult us on the Mandal commission." Mr V.P. Singh

did not accept his request to delay the announcement on the commission recommendations because of the rally that was to be held in the capital.

Mr Advani said when the BJP agreed to support the National Front government, it was accepted that the government would not venture into the areas of controversy between the two parties. "For example, we do not expect that this government will scrap article 370 and we shall not pressure it into doing so. Similarly, it was expected that the government will operate in the areas where we have agreement, but this has not happened."

He said the BJP wished to acquire power to serve the people without sacrificing values. "When politics is practised by sacrificing values, it becomes amoral," he said in an oblique indictment of the government.

He strongly protested against the manipulation of issues with an eye on the vote-banks. "We do not underestimate the value of votes but we do not want to go about creating vote-banks in a manner that hurts national interest."

Mr Advani sought to dispel the impression in the press that major decisions would be taken at the party camp. "This is not the forum for taking major decisions. The views that will be expressed will form inputs for the decision-making process."

In his hour-long address, the BJP president refrained from making any reference to the Ram Janambhoomi issue.

All senior leaders of the party are attending the three-day camp. Two of the three party chief ministers, Mr Bhairon Singh Shekhawat and Mr Shanta Kumar, could not make it to the inaugural function.

As the study camp got underway, the Madhya Pradesh chief minister, Mr Sunderlal Patwa, recalled the founder-president, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee's statement that "it should be a political party with a difference." In this context, he mentioned the absence of banners, posters and welcome arches which set a note of austerity.

Mr Advani underlined another difference between the BJP and the other parties. "In the past, there was an attitude among editors that a person with formal journalism education was not good enough to be a journalist. Similarly, in the film industry, the attitude was that there is no need for any formal training. But times have changed and in these two areas, it is accepted that other things being equal, formal training does help.

"But the situation in politics is still the same. The same attitude continues that no training is necessary for politicians. Through these study camps, we want to emphasise that training does make a difference and we are a different political party," he added.

Stand on Ayodhya*91AS0100B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 19 Sep 90 p 1*

[Article: "BJP To Abide by Verdict on Ayodhya"]

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 18. In a significant climbdown, the BJP Bharatiya Janata Party leaders, Mr L.K. Advani and Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, have agreed to abide by the court decision on the vexatious Ayodhya issue, to go in for an amicable settlement and, perhaps even more important in the context of the party's proposed yatra to Ayodhya, to issue an appeal to the public to refrain from aggravating the prevailing communal tension.

The BJP leaders were party to a unanimous resolution adopted today by the committee on promotion of communal harmony and addressed mainly to the government and to other political parties and organisations.

The resolution at the outset called for a continuing dialogue and discussion to consider and decide the site of the temple at Ayodhya and allied problems to the satisfaction of all concerned with a view to reaching an amicable settlement.

"The government should be urged to try and expedite the decision of the court in this matter and decision of the court should be respected," stated the committee's resolution. In the meantime, it said, no attempt should be made to aggravate the communal tension which already exists.

The change of stance in the BJP position came in the presence of Mr Chandra Shekhar, Mr C.K. Jaffer Sharief, Dr Rafiq Zakaria, Brig P. Sailo, Ms Shabana Azami, Mr Shahid Siddiqi, Mr K.F. Rustamji, Mr B.G. Verghese, Mr Prem Bhatia, Mrs Suhasini Ali, Mr M. Farooqi, Dr Romila Thapar and Prof Satish Chandra (convener).

Not only the presence of the two BJP leaders but also their being a party to this resolution has a great deal of political significance.

In the three-day BJP conclave at Bhopal, Mr Advani had expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of the National Front government on various issues and assailed Mr V.P. Singh for being no different from Mr Rajiv Gandhi in dealing with issues pertaining to nationalism and secularism, as both the Janata Dal and the Congress indulged in the "politics of vote".

Declaring that it was not willing to compromise both on the Babri Masjid issue and on Kashmir, the BJP leadership had felt that the Mosque issue was not an issue of the majority community but a national issue to which all should contribute in finding a solution. It feels that secularism should not mean Hindu-baiting nor it should imply appeasement of the minorities. However, it felt that the government was going out of its way to appease the minorities and to pander to their demands if only to ensure its vote-banks.

Stand on Elections*91AS0100C Madras THE HINDU in English
21 Sep 90 p 1*

[Article: "BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] To Go it Alone in Next Poll"]

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 20. In a major shift from its position of favouring one to one contests against the Congress(I) in different parts of the country, the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] will be seeking the mandate of the people in the next Lok Sabha elections on its own.

Consequently, the next polls are likely to witness three cornered contests in the majority of constituencies and will put BJP candidates against the nominees of the National Front [NF] whose government the party is supporting at present besides the candidates of the Congress(I). Interestingly, the party leadership does not believe that the triangular contests would benefit the Congress(I).

According to an assessment made by the BJP High Command, there appears to be a consensus amongst its legislators and rank and file that the party should portray itself as a national alternative. Having established itself to a large degree in both the North and Western parts of India, the BJP now proposes to consolidate its position in the South and North-East. Therefore it will put up candidates in as many seats as possible in various parts.

It is felt that if from two seats in the last Lok Sabha, the party could swell its number to 85 plus in 1989, there was no reason why it should not improve its position further since the people continued to be disillusioned with the Congress(I). The opinion within the party is that the performance of both the Congress(I) and the National Front governments would be before the people who have to make the final choice by exercising their judgment.

The BJP leadership feels that the main issue before the people would be the positive and comparative performance of the BJP vis-a-vis the other parties who have formed governments at the Centre or in some State or the other. The people would make comparisons and thus opt for the BJP, it is argued. However, it is not exactly known what stand the high command is likely to take in defence of its support to the National Front Government if the BJP has to accuse it of "non performance on several counts" at the time of the next elections.

Mr Krishan Lal Sharma, MP [Member of Parliament] and general secretary of the BJP said that his party was perusing several issues exclusively. It had very distinct views on Punjab and Kashmir, the Ramjanambhoomi temple issue and the Minority Commission.

The distancing from the National Front which has a minority coalition government at the Centre with the support of both the BJP and the Left parties has come

because of its stubbornness to implement certain decisions without holding any consultations.

Hasty move: Mr Sharma said that the Government had not adopted the correct approach in hastily implementing the Mandal Commission recommendations even though it was a common point in the manifestoes of the NF and the BJP. Secondly, its negative approach on the Delhi Statehood Bill had upset the rank and file of the party.

Talking about other subjects, he said that the Muslim leaders were no longer opposing the construction of the Ramjanam Mandir. However, it was the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav who had been making provocative statements as if he was "head of some Gulf country." Even the Shahi imam of Jama Masjid said recently that there should be a settlement.

Mr Sharma said so far all legal opinion was in favour of the Ram Janam Mandir. He clarified that BJP was of the view that litigation was no answer to the dispute.

Punjab Law-and-Order Report Deemed 'Grim'

91AS0095A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 17 Sep 90 p 7

[Text] Chandigarh, 16 Sep—Even as the National Front government plans to hold assembly elections in Punjab before the expiry of President's rule, the Punjab government has, in its latest law and order report, painted a grim picture of the situation in the state.

The report prepared early this week admits that the situation has considerably worsened and spread from the three border districts to other regions of the state.

Of the 6,000 to 7,000 terrorists operating in the state, only about 1,000 have been identified.

Interestingly, the report cites the move to revive the political process among the reasons for the spurt in terrorist violence. The terrorists are feeling emboldened by the prospect of assuming power. Some of the groups feel that revival of the democratic process would provide them with a breather.

Concern has been expressed over the supply of weapons and intensified moral support from across the border, increased subversive propaganda against the security forces and the government, revival of attacks on soft targets like family members of security personnel and politicians and entry of criminals into the ranks of terrorists.

It also notes with concern attempts by the terrorists to paralyse the working of village defence committees and pickets manned by special police officers (SPOs) through snatching of weapons and killings. The village defence committees and SPO pickets had been mooted when Mr J. F. Ribeiro was the police chief.

Desertions from the police and SPO posts is also continuing. Recently, three Punjab police bodyguards attached to the Akali Dal (Badal) senior vice-president, Mr Sukhjinder Singh, absconded with weapons.

The terrorists are increasingly resorting to explosives and have procured a large number of remote-control devices. Security forces are bearing the brunt of this, going by the casualties suffered in landmine blasts in the border districts and increased kidnappings of relatives of police personnel.

A case in point is the abduction of the director-general of the Punjab police (operations), Mr D.S. Mangat, a few days ago, three close relatives of the SSP [Senior Superintendent of Police] of Faridkot were murdered in their houses in Amritsar district. The number of personnel of the security forces and the Punjab police killed has risen steadily, putting the forces on the defensive.

The report notes that there is increased interference in the functioning of the government departments by militants in rural areas. The writ of the state government has virtually ceased to run in some rural parts.

'Phenomenal' Oil Reserves Discovered in Northeast

91AS0099A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 6 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar: "Oil Reserves Discovered in N.E."]

[Text] New Delhi, September 5. Oil India Ltd has discovered that shale formations in the north-east could yield a phenomenal 70 billion tonnes of recoverable oil, which is a hundred times as much as proven oil reserves today.

Exploitation of this oil could convert India from a big importer of oil into a big exporter, but probably not for some time.

Shale oil is expensive as it involves mining the shale and baking it to releasing the oil. This is why it has attracted only limited interest from multinationals the world over. The cost of extraction could be \$25 a barrel, and processing could cost up to \$10 a barrel more.

However, processing the oil yields not just the usual refined products but also several valuable petrochemicals, and this compensates in some measure for the high costs.

Shale oil production is already a commercially established process. According to Mr Chudamani Ratnam, head of Oil India, the USSR already produces around 30 million tonnes of shale oil a year, China is aiming to increase its production to 10 million tonnes a year, and smaller plants are in production in the U.S. and Australia.

If the Gulf crisis keeps world oil prices high, then shale oil could become economic the world over. India suffers from a foreign exchange shortage and will, therefore, happily produce it even at a cost significantly higher than the world price. The steady depreciation of the rupee will make such production competitive with the passage of time.

Apart from the big shale formations, Oil India has found that the coal currently mined in Upper Assam, near Makum, can also be converted into oil by baking in retorts. So can a lot of shale already mined and discarded as waste.

The cost of processing this could be quite low meriting high priority: coal production from the Makum Field, according to Mr Ratnam, is around 700,000 tonnes a year today, and this can be processed into 200,000 tonnes of oil and 400,000 tonnes of coke.

The proven coal reserves there are as high as 240 million tonnes and indicated reserves come to another 360 million tonnes. So it is possible to greatly increase the output of Makum coal (and the oil and coke it will yield).

Incidentally, the coke is also of great value in metallurgical industries such as steel, and will substitute imports of coking coal.

In an academic paper, Mr Ratnam and two of his colleagues estimated the recoverable shale oil reserves very tentatively at 14 billion tonnes. But this is based on open-cast mining to a depth of only 100 metres.

In fact India is already doing open-cast mining up to 500 metres depth which means the recoverable oil reserves will be around 70 billion tonnes.

The shale deposits are two to three kilometres thick, so that as technology permits deeper mining the amount of recoverable oil will automatically go up.

Large though India's shale deposits seem, deposits in the U.S. and the USSR are hundreds of times larger. The mined shale is placed in what are called low-temperature carbonisations (LTC) plants and baked to a temperature of up to 300 degrees, at which point the oil trapped in the shale is released.

In their paper, Mr Ratnam and his colleagues have proposed a mammoth project producing no less than 140 million tonnes of shale oil per year. That will require the extraction of perhaps 1,500 million tonnes of shale per year, which is far more than the entire output of the coal industry today.

The investment required will be huge. But even if it takes seven or eight years, it will (if successful) make India more than self-sufficient.

There are some tricky political and environmental problems to be overcome. Even though modern open-cast mining requires less labour than traditional techniques, the sort of project proposed by Mr Ratnam and his

colleagues could require 100,000 employees. Many lakhs more will come to trade and supply the mine workers with goods. An influx of this magnitude could cause problems in Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, which have relatively small populations and do not want to be swamped by newcomers.

The bulk of the shale oil deposits are in these two states, and only a small portion lies in Assam.

However, the deposits in Assam could yield a lot of jobs to locals and ease some of the tensions that exist today. On the other hand, this part of Assam is controlled today by the United Liberation Front of Assam, a militant secessionist group, demanding ransom from tea companies. This could make any project in the area a nightmare for managers.

The Assamese will be pleased to learn that it makes economic sense to process shale oil on the spot instead of pumping it out of the state for refining, something the locals object violently to.

The spent shale will have to be disposed of, and is regarded by some environmentalists as a nightmare.

Oil companies in the US have already run into environmental trouble, because the spent shale is infertile and vegetation does not grow easily on it. Besides, the shale deposits are located on some of the densest tropical jungles left in India, and the forests have a high ecological value.

Mr Ratnam calculates that a tree in a forest of this kind takes 60 years to mature, meaning that not more than one-sixtieth of the trees should be cut in any one year in order to permit natural regeneration of the forest.

He thinks felling should be restricted to just one percent.

However, it is unclear whether the natural forest will in fact regenerate. Open-cast mining requires clear-felling, and selective felling is not possible.

The topsoil will first be extracted and kept on one side for subsequent refilling. The mined shale will be baked, and the spent shale after baking will later be dumped back in the spot it was first mined from. It will then be covered with the topsoil. However, even after restoration in this way the end result might be pasture or something quite different from the original tropical forest.

An alternative will be to explore techniques of in situ oil extraction. In this technique, holes are drilled into the shale deposits and the rocks underground are heated, so that the oil trickles into the holes and can be pumped out.

This process is not yet commercially proven, and may not be suitable for producing really large volumes.

Oil India has asked a British consulting company called Robertson Research to conduct a more detailed study which will shed greater light on the size of reserves and options for extraction.

The shale deposits in the North-East were first discovered way back in the early 1960s by the Central Fuel Research Institute. But shale oil had no value in those days of cheap oil, and nobody followed up.

Oil India was quite astounded when it followed the trail this year and realised how enormous the oil potential was. Geologically, there are two types of shale oil deposits—in what are called the Barail and Disang formations.

Barail shale yields 95 litres of oil per tonne of shale, and Disang shale yields 100 litres per tonne.

On the other hand, Barail coal (of the sort found in the Makum coalfield) yields 300 litres per tonne, a very good yield. Oil of this variety contains as much as 18 percent olefins, which are normally obtained by cracking naphtha in a petrochemical complex.

The oil also contains 22 percent of aromatics (benzene, toluene and xylenes) which form the basis of industries such as paraxylens, PTA, polyester yarn, and many more.

In short, the processing of such coal in the Makum and adjacent areas could lead to a major petrochemical and textile complex.

Reportage On Building of Hindu Temple Continues

VHP Official: Plan 'Irreversible'

91AS0096A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 17 Sep 90 p 10

[Text] Ahmedabad, 16 Sep—Mr Shachandra Dikshit, vice-president of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, (VHP), said here yesterday that the decision to start constructing the Ram Janmabhoomi temple at Ayodhya from 30 October was irreversible.

Addressing a press conference, he said over 2,50,000 [as printed] volunteers and supporters of the parishad who have already registered themselves as "kar sevaks" were prepared for the highest sacrifice. "We will not break any law, except prohibitory orders," he said.

A retired director-general of police of Uttar Pradesh [UP], Mr Dikshit said that the decision to start constructing the temple at the present site and date was taken at a Sant Sammelan. The construction, which was earlier to begin on 14 February, was deferred by the organisers to save the government at the Centre from any embarrassment in view of the assembly elections.

The Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, had asked for time to settle the issue but nothing has been done so far.

He said that the attitude of the U.P. chief minister, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav, towards the Ayodhya issue has been very hostile. Mr Yadav could not arrest the Shankaracharya and all the "kar sevaks." He could not any more check the construction of the temple for which the "shilanyas" had already been performed, he said.

Mr Dikshit said that he had talks with a cross-section of the people over the issue and found that the leaders of the Muslim community who have a vested interest did not want to have a settlement. He also sounded a note of warning that unless the tendency to appease minorities to retain them as vote banks was checked right now, the pre-Independence situation might arise again.

Referring to reports appearing in a section of the press that the VHP [Vishwa Hindu Parishad] could not muster enough "kar sevaks" to go ahead with its plan, he said that more people have offered to come forward than the site could accommodate. Moreover, he said, the international press would watch the ceremony and was free to form its own opinion.

When his attention was drawn to an allegation that the VHP was not attending to honour court verdicts, he said it were [as published] other organisations like the Sunni central Wakf board which has gone on appeal against the permanent injunction granted by the civil judge of Faizabad on 3 March 1951 to Hindus for their unfettered right to worship Lord Rama in the existing temple located in the precincts of the Babri Masjid.

The judgment was subsequently confirmed by a division branch of the Allahabad high court in April 1955.

Mr Dikshit, during his current visit to the state, will attend a Sant Sammelan in the city and also a similar sammelan of the Saurashtra region at Rajkot today. He will also meet the retired police officers of the state.

Negotiation Initiative Supported

91AS0096B Madras THE HINDU in English
15 Sep 90 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, 14 Sep—Though the Government efforts to resolve the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue amicably through negotiation and understanding did not make satisfactory progress it has now endorsed the initiative taken by the Sankaracharya of the Kanchi Kamakoti Peetam, Shri Jayendra Saraswathi and the immediate favourable response to his proposal by the leaders of Babri Masjid Action Committee, including the Naib Imam of Jama Masjid, Syed Ahmed Bukhari.

An official spokesman said here today that that the statement of the Kanchi Acharya and the Muslim leader's response to it were "welcome" and could well be a "take off" point for a fresh Government initiative for a negotiated settlement of the issue as this new approach of the leaders of the two communities has revived hopes of avoiding a confrontation.

The Kanchi Acharya had told newsmen in Kancheepuram on Tuesday that the Union Government should immediately convene a meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders on the issue. He had expressed his willingness to participate in the conference if an invitation was extended to him. This statement of the Kanchi Acharya was hailed by a section of Muslim leaders. Mr Bukhari said that the only way to peace and communal harmony was through dialogue and negotiations.

(A PTI report said the Government was thinking of convening such a meeting towards the end of this month.)

The spokesman said, the National Front Government, had, in its election manifesto, pledged to find a negotiated settlement of the issue. In keeping with this, a few days after assuming power it began consultations with the representatives of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee.

He said the Government had still not abandoned hopes of arriving at an amicable settlement. In case all attempts fail, the Government would go by the court verdict, he said.

UNI reports:

The Babri Masjid Movement Co-ordination Committee (BMMCC) urged the Centre and the State Governments concerned to resist the march to Ayodhya proposed by the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] president, Mr L.K. Advani "if India is to be saved."

At an emergency meeting here, the BMMCC said the Central and State Governments concerned as well as all the political parties must "pick up the gauntlet thrown by Mr Advani and resolutely resist the march of Hindu fascism."

It also called upon the Muslim community not to lose patience and as responsible citizens extend "full cooperation to the other secular forces in the struggle against the rising menace of chauvinism..."

IRAN

Iranians Give Medical Aid, Promise Oil Help

91AF0161z Lusaka *TIMES OF ZAMBIA* in English
12 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] President Kaunda has commended Iran for donating one million tablets of chloroquine to help Zambia combat malaria, one of the killer diseases.

He also praised Iran for showing concern to the health of Zambians saying this kind of attitude towards mankind demonstrated Iran was a truly revolutionary friend.

The President was speaking at State House yesterday before he hosted a working breakfast in honor of the visiting Iranian parliamentary delegation led by Mr Ramsan Rohaninia.

Mr Rohaninia told the President that in addition to the chloroquine tablets, his country would soon provide 300 spray pumps to help in the fight against malaria.

The President recalled that Iran had not only provided the drugs for the killer disease but made available a number of doctors who had carried out research work to control malaria.

The recommendations from the Iranian doctors would assist Zambia to eradicate malaria in the same way smallpox had been wiped out years back.

Cde Kaunda also saluted the Iranian government for pledging to help Zambia with oil in view of the current Gulf crisis.

The oil offer would help to solve some economic problems facing Zambia considering that petrol prices had already gone up.

Cde Kaunda said the oil offer was most welcome and promised that he would discuss the issue with his compatriots to see how they could utilize the commodity.

Mr Rohaninia told the President whatever sufferings hit Zambians also affected Iranians.

Mr Rohaninia, who was accompanied to State House by the Iranian ambassador to Zambia Mr Mohsen Pakaein, pledged that his country would continue to assist Zambia in all areas of development to strengthen the bilateral relations between the two countries.—Zana.

PAKISTAN

Article Examines PPP Strengths, Weaknesses

91AS0113B Lahore *VIEWPOINT* in English
11 Oct 90 pp 7-8

[Text] Every political organisation should make a periodic appraisal of its strength and weaknesses; this is even more necessary for the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] because it is the country's biggest political party.

Perhaps, a good occasion for such an exercise by the PPP is provided by what happened in the Lahore High Court premises when Benazir Bhutto arrived there on October 2 in answer to a summons on account of a reference made by President Ishaq. A massive pro-PPP crowd gathered outside the High Court; after the compound gates were thrown open, the crowd came inside and, finding access to the court room barred, it became restive and later almost riotous.

The Happening

As a result, not only did the scheduled hearing become impossible, but the object of the crowd's respect and loyalty, Benazir Bhutto, herself was caught in the melee, and is reported to have fainted for some time. PPP leaders declare that the trouble was deliberately instigated by a large number of police commandos. It is also

said that, harassed by tough police tactics, a section of the crowd became unruly, and broke into the court room and destroyed much of the furniture. Even if the narration is truthful, the explanation is just not good enough. Such provocation by police agents should have been anticipated and guarded against, by disciplining PPP supporters and preventing their rush into the court room. The PPP leaders were either unwilling or unable to do so.

The High Court has taken the unusual step of ordering a full bench inquiry into the episode, issuing contempt notices to ten PPP leaders. A related petition has also been filed on behalf of the PPP leader. The hearings should allow one to apportion blame between the PPP militants and the Punjab Government factotums. However, even before the inquiry could start, President Ishaq has, with extraordinary lack of prudence, condemned the PPP for its "fascist" methods, promising that the long arm of the law will punish all evil-doers. His position as Head of State calls for more circumspection and a more convincing demonstration of impartiality in all matters of State.

What brings most strength to the PPP is Benazir Bhutto's popularity, and the PPP's surviving image of being the poor man's and the victimised woman's party. The second factor that adds to the PPP's stature is the absence of an acceptable alternative political leadership. The IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] does not fit the bill; it consists mainly of the pygmy remnants of Zia's martial law—every dictator's willing collaborators. Others who have joined the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] bandwagon have done so out of personal pique or in the hope of making political gains with the administration's help. Then, the vulgarly partisan Care-taker governments, the selective accountability and the stream of venomous filth that is being spewed through the State-controlled media have brought little credibility to President Ishaq and his Care-takers, and brought the victimised party massive public support. It has helped the PPP to recover the ground lost during its 20 months of undistinguished rule.

This phenomenon is easy to understand. When horse-trading is mentioned, people remember Chhanga Manga, Murree and Lahore's well-guarded and overflowing second-class hotels; these came before Swat. As for corruption, they know of the fortunes made before 1988 through unsecured bank loans or loans written off. The list of IJI beneficiaries over the last decade is a long one. The people also know a little about big names and big drug money. Nor is it a secret that some publicists have joined the anti-PPP campaign only because they had asked for and were refused favours—either denied a ticket for the elections or the high grade they coveted. Nor have most people appreciated the vicious campaign by official maulvis condemning woman's rule. More ugly and reprehensible are the silly fatwas issued by the Khatib of Lahore's Badshahi Mosque, with the holy book placed on his empty head. Most of these IJI tactics bring grist to the PPP's mills.

PPP's Condition

The PPP certainly suffers from a strange condition created by great strength coupled with structural weaknesses. Its support among the masses, resting on the Bhutto name (both father and daughter), is just not matched by its organized strength. Despite declarations, no real effort has been made to build an organization and create an elected hierarchy that would compel the party ranks at all levels to maintain the required measure of cohesiveness and discipline. Then, over recent years, following the example of Zia's creatures, political rewards are often given greater importance than political responsibility. And emotive slogans are considered good enough for mass mobilization; the political illiteracy of most activists and cadres, and even a substantive section of the leadership, has not been remedied. The party's functioning reveals a vacuum between the top of the leadership pyramid and the base; there is virtually no acknowledged middle leadership. Most PPP leaders do not depend on their work but on recognition by Benazir Bhutto to bring them acceptance among the party rank and file.

More attention needs to be paid to the party's programme and policies. Forgetting the like failings of other political parties, the PPP must chart a clear course—no dithering, no meandering. Even now, the PPP should make an effort to give the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance] a more well-defined programme, outlining its immediate objectives as well as its long-term targets, so that the people can be asked to vote on the basis of policy options and can ignore the malicious polemics, the personal charge and counter-charge, that are the mainstay of today's electioneering.

For genuine elections, not only must the administration be neutral, but politics must be politicized. The People's Party should compel other parties to join a political debate, so that national issues determine the people's vote and not biradari affiliations, fear of the administration, or the lure of money. This is the path to Pakistan's redemption.

Commentary Says Election Code of Conduct Vague

91AS0113A Lahore VIEWPOINT in English
11 Oct 90 pp 5-6

[Text] No exception whatsoever can be taken to the stated purpose of the Code of Conduct formulated by the Election Commission for all candidates contesting the National and Provincial Assembly elections and their political parties, namely, that elections may be held in a "free, fair and peaceful atmosphere." The 12-point Code lays down certain conditions for the candidates and their parties, but it seems most strange that nothing at all has been said about the conduct of the Care-taker administration which will be responsible for helping the Commission to perform its statutory duty of keeping the democratic process impartial and clean. This is all the more surprising because since August 6, a spate of

complaints have been laid at its door by all non-IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] parties and concrete instances have been cited of attempts being made by the Care-taker Governments to influence the poll results through misuse of official machinery, mis-direction of public funds, and various other acts that impinge on the conduct of elections. If the Commission is unable to deal effectively with such grievances, its 12-point Code will be seen to be an exercise in futility and could even be viewed as a measure that could be used for partisan purposes.

The various acts that are to be done or not done under the Code make a formidable list; in general, there can be no disagreement with most injunctions issued by the Election Commission. It may be presumed that District Judges will be empowered to recommend necessary action if the parties or individuals concerned are seen to violate the undertaking that has been made mandatory for them before they can take part in the elections. It is, obviously, right and proper that political parties or their agents should not break up meetings or interrupt speeches or prevent the dissemination of propaganda by the other side. Again, political parties should avoid criticism that has no bearing on their rival's public activities; and all speeches and slogans should be based on principles of morality, decorum and decency. It is also laid down sensibly that electoral speeches calculated to arouse parochial feelings and controversy or conflicts between sects, communities and linguistic groups will be eschewed. Public leaders are expected to propagate their views with a sense of responsibility and dignity befitting their status, and refrain from interfering with the other's freedom to do so. Appeals or resort to violence during processions and meetings must be avoided, and the carrying of lethal weapons will be banned as well as the use of crackers and explosives. Political parties and candidates are expected to co-operate with officers on election duty and scrupulously avoid activities that come under the rubric of corrupt practices, including bribery, intimidation, impersonation or disregard of restrictions on canvassing after the hours fixed for this purpose. These and similar safeguards should help to make the election impartial and honest. The Election Commissioners can, of course, see for themselves how far these rulers are being respected today.

However, it must be said that the crucial Clause One of the Code, which states that "political parties shall not propagate any opinion or act in a manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or independence of the Judiciary of Pakistan or which defames or brings into ridicule the Judiciary or the armed forces of Pakistan, as provided under Article 63 of the Constitution," invites grave misgivings. Particularly its first part remains wholly vague. No-one has yet defined or explained how the term "ideology of Pakistan" is to be interpreted. Will its definition be based on the resolutions of the Muslim League and the formal speeches of the Founder of Pakistan, or will a definition be contrived in the light of interpretations given by different political leaders who often disagree even on basic essentials? No court can be expected to interpret this clause with a view to barring its violation by candidates or political parties without clear guidelines. Who will give the guidelines? The other parts of this clause are also vague, but it can be said that a judge will interpret them in accordance with the law of the land extant. Even Article 63 of the Constitution needs to be read with the country's basic law, including Fundamental Rights, and in terms of specific offences that are culpable under the Criminal Code. Any other method of implementing this clause would leave far too much to the discretion of the District Judges and place on their shoulders a responsibility that all of them may not be able to carry.

The Election Commission will be expected to clarify the main points raised here. First, how far does it intend to control the functioning of the Care-taker Governments for which the Lahore High Court laid down clear guidelines in 1988. Secondly, the highest judicial authority must define the manner in which the District and Sessions Judges are to interpret and implement Clause One of the Code. Unless proper safeguards relating to these matters are provided, many fear that the aim of the Code of Conduct may be defeated when, in the hurly-burly of the electoral contest, scores of District Judges are asked to lay down the law whose implementation will influence the election results—and may, thus, even thwart the will of the people.

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